LONDON METROPOLITAN UNIVERSITY

CHILD & WOMAN ABUSE STUDIES UNIT

LITERATURE REVIEW:

THE LINKS BETWEEN RADICALISATION AND VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND GIRLS

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This is a literature review on what we know about the connections between radicalisation and violence against women and girls. We ran 85 searches of academic databases and used Google Scholar where there was little available through peer reviewed journals. The searches and this literature review focus on religious supremacist formations (otherwise known as fundamentalism) and racial/white supremacists (or Far Right and Alt-Right organisations and ideology).

We begin by defining racial and religious supremacism and then discuss gendered approaches to preventing violent extremism. The main part of this literature review is structured according to five common themes: purity and imperialism; intimate partner and family violence; sexual violence; anti-feminism; and masculinity.

PURITY AND IMPERIALISM

There is an emphasis on religious or racial purity often expressed through a nostalgic harking back to 'golden days' of empire: there are gendered dimensions, since these were times when men's superior position was secure. For religious fundamentalists this is exemplified as male headship of families, for the Alt-Right it refers to men as entitled sexual actors.

INTIMATE PARTNER AND FAMILY VIOLENCE

While there are limited insights on the personal lives of fundamentalist actors, the literature does indicate that the patriarchal family and gender inequality lie at the heart of fundamentalist projects. These are justified using religious injunctions of 'obedience' and 'authority'. The same injunctions are used to legitimise intimate partner violence and sexual coercion. Literature on the Hindu Right, Islamism and Sikh fundamentalism highlights how women are seen as the property of the group, chastity is emphasised for women within the group, sex is restricted to procreation and there is an expectation of the wife's sexual subservience to the husband. Women are denied any sexual or bodily autonomy and therefore fundamentalist projects are in direct contradiction to feminism. Religious laws are enacted that infantilise women, diminish their rights and make them the property of the husband and his family. Violence hangs over women as a threat and is used against women from within that group when they are seen to be transgressing or flouting patriarchal rules. Little is known about the family lives of women recruited into fundamentalist organisations but some of the literature on ISIS indicates that women are restricted to the private sphere, forced into marriage and polygyny.

In terms of racial supremacists, academic work on intimate partner violence is limited and commentary or journalistic pieces have tended to focus on the childhood histories of mass killers. The data is not yet robust, especially in terms of differentiating between abuse in childhood and being controlling and abusive in adult heterosexual relationships. The wider connections to VAWG, and especially to domestic and family violence are often vague and cast a wide net – from perpetrating violence against partners or

compiling 'rape lists' to simply having sexist ideas. There is one study from the US which contends that in one year 84% of those committing mass shootings included killing an ex or current partner or a family member. Other research on 'school shooters' suggests that many have histories of being bullied which was not addressed in school. Studies of the British Far Right offer little in relation to childhood abuse and violence.

SEXUAL VIOLENCE

Sexual violence features in the literature on religious and racial supremacist organisations, although it takes a somewhat different shape, with various forms of sexual violence prominent. For religious supremacists, women inside the group are de-sexualised and divested of sexual autonomy, while women outside the group are hyper-sexualised and deemed unworthy of respect or protection. There are many documented examples of both ISIS and the Hindu Right using sexual violence as a weapon. A significant amount of the literature on fundamentalist groups concerns ISIS' sexual enslavement of Yezidi women. We also found evidence of both Christian and Islamist organisations trafficking in girls and young women for early/forced marriage and offering them as a 'reward' to male group members.

The links with the Alt-Right are not so direct, since their framing is entitlement to sex and resentment towards women's sexual autonomy. Academic work on the Alt-Right has analysed the 'manosphere' – spaces on the internet where men express explicit sexism and craft accounts of male victimhood. There have been case studies where mass killers in the US, Canada and Australia have supported Incel thinking. The Incel literature shows that some of these young men take up instruction on how to pressurise and coerce women into sex, but we have limited knowledge of the extent to which they put this into practice. We do know that a proportion of this group engage in targeted sexual harassment of women on social media. One study looks at 'rejection violence' – men who wreak revenge for being sexually rejected - here violence is linked to men's resentment at the loss of their taken for granted dominance. There is a strong theme in the Incel material on challenging feminist analysis of domestic violence and rape; with an internal theme that justifies 'date rape' through 'pick up culture'. For some of these men masculinity is restored through violence, including through organised sexual harassment online: they perform masculinity with one another through hostility to women.

Little has been written on the UK Far Right and sexual violence but we note an alignment of interests across Sikh fundamentalists, the English Defence League and National Action in the way that they instrumentalise public attention to sexual exploitation in the UK in order to ferment anti-Muslim racism.

ANTI-FEMINISM

Feminism is seen by religious and racial supremacists as usurping the natural order of male dominance, with fundamentalists around the world targeting women's human rights defenders and engaging in an assault on a range of women's human rights. The Alt-Right targets feminism more explicitly. They are united by a backward-looking masculinity, which seeks to reassert different forms of male supremacy through rolling back women's rights and silencing feminist dissent.

MASCULINITY CONSTRUCTS

There is a shared sense of aggrieved masculinity in which the use of violence is seen to restore power and influence. Within the literature a series of masculinity constructs have been associated with forms of religious and racial supremacy: aggressive masculinity; aggrieved masculinity; beta masculinity; outraged masculinity; militarised masculinity; hypermasculinity; toxic masculinity; righteous masculinity; hybrid masculinities; ideological masculinity; nerd masculinity; and violent masculinity. These are not synonymous and deserve further attention to unpick how relevant they are to violent extremism.

This literature review was part of a wider project on radicalisation and violence against women and girls (VAWG), intended to explore what connections have been theorised and documented between the two.

We conducted 85 literature searches restricted to the last 30 years (1989 to 2019). While most of the material within the white supremacist section is very recent, the 30-year time period was intended to capture writings on the resurgence of fundamentalist activity in the UK from the late 1980s and early 1990s. We searched academic databases seeking connections between radicalisation and violence against women and girls. We extended the search to include Google Scholar because there was little available through academic databases. The literature searches involved various permutations of the following search terms - extremism or radicalisation or terrorism + violence against women / + sexual violence or sexual assault or sexual abuse or sexual harassment/ + misogyny or sexism/ + women's rights/ fundamentalism / specific Islamist organisations / UK Far Right / Incels / Alt-Right.

The searches returned a combination of academic journal articles, book reviews, newspaper articles and feature pieces. We had to exclude a number of the returns because of lack of access to the items. To top up the items on fundamentalism, we also added relevant articles published by known gender and fundamentalism journals *Women Against Fundamentalism, Feminist Dissent* and *Women Living Under Muslim Laws,* and extracted further items by searching journals on the subject of terrorism for articles on VAWG, gender and women's rights. Unfortunately, most of the literature on fundamentalist movements is based on an analysis of events, public discourse and political ideologies. This focuses on organisations and ideologies but does not give as much of a sense of the personal-political biographies of the individuals that join these organisations. The literature searches on white supremacism produced very limited sources from peer reviewed journals and even less which document original research. The literature on the Far Right in the UK is especially sparse with respect to the themes for this literature review. While there are papers on Britain First and National Action, the focus is primarily on documenting their history and exploring the potential consequences of banning them as extremist organisations. The limited attention to gender or violence against women in the literature on the British Far Right means that more emphasis has been paid to material on the Alt-Right and Incels. With the Alt-Right searches, a high proportion of the returns focused on Gamergate[1] and Trump, most of which did not meet our inclusion criteria. There is very little academic work on Incels, so Google Scholar proved to be a better source than academic databases.

In our analysis of the relevant items, we focused on exploring what forms of VAWG they mention, the source of their data (we were particularly looking for case analyses but this was limited), how the authors

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[1] This refers to an organised and sustained campaign of sexual harassment by male gamers that began in 2014, targeting female video game developers, and the journalists who reported on the abuse. The harassment included rape and death threats to a number of women, and their supporters online. The harassment was organised through social media sites, especially Twitter, 4chan and Reddit. A strong theme in the millions of posts was objection to the supposed influence of feminism on video game culture.

theorised the connection between that supremacist organisation (or terrorism in general) and VAWG, and to draw out any specific deployment of concepts like masculinity, gender, misogyny, and patriarchy.

This review is a thematic analysis of that literature. We begin with an introduction to the two strands of supremacism that we investigated – religious supremacism (or fundamentalism) and racial supremacism (or the Alt-Right and Far Right). We discuss the more generic literature on gender and terrorism and then we hone in on five key themes that cut across the literature on religious and racial supremacism: purity and imperialism; intimate partner and family violence; sexual violence; anti-feminism; and masculinity.

DEFINING RELIGIOUS SUPREMACIST OR FUNDAMENTALIST MOVEMENTS

The literature on religious fundamentalist groups and ideologies has grown since the 1970s, particularly since the emergence of a theocratic state in Iran, and there has been an exponential increase since 9/11. Across much of this literature, there is no uniform definition of fundamentalism as some writers use the term to describe orthodox religious practice and introverted communities rather than political movements interested in galvanising power. As a starting point, however, Torkel Brekke (2012) argues religious fundamentalists are modern movements but their primary objective is to re-instate clerical power and religious authority. Many writers on fundamentalism recognise the centrality of women and girls to fundamentalist projects, which share a pre-occupation with controlling women, their mobility, their bodies, their sexual relations and minds (see Bhatt, 1997; Imam et al., 2004; Ruthven, 2004; Brekke, 2012; Cowden and Sahgal, 2017). Moreover, when literature searches combine the terms 'fundamentalism' + 'gender' + 'violence against women' + 'women's rights' there is a distinct confluence in the way that their interest in women is theorised.

As a baseline, we use the following definition, originally developed by Women Against Fundamentalism and extended by *Feminist Dissent*:

> By religious fundamentalism we refer to modern religious-political interpretations of religious texts, which aim to create a social order based on a 'return to fundamentals' of an imaginary utopian past. The control of the minds and bodies of women and sexual minorities are central to this ideology. Fundamentalist movements want to impose their version of religion as the only valid one. They aim to reduce plural spaces and the right to interpret, dissent and doubt. They are often backed by violence or the threat of violence aimed at creating an atmosphere of terror. They are frequently flexible about the means they deploy and may seek to overthrow the existing order or make use of the institutions of the state such as parliament, the army, police and judiciary. They tend to use modern technologies and cultural and democratic spaces in order to establish and consolidate their power, whether in the community or the state. In many cases they make skilful use of the language of human rights while undermining fundamental rights and the

principle of universality. In the most extreme cases, their ideology and activities amount to crimes against humanity and genocide.[2]

From his research on Islamism and Hindutva, Chetan Bhatt (1997) adds that fundamentalists are authoritarian movements that lay claim to 'absolute truths', as they oppose all attempts to 'reinterpret' religious texts. They seek to assert a mythical golden past. Stephen Cowden and Gita Sahgal (2017) point out that fundamentalists manipulate concerns about the impact of neo-liberalism and globalisation for their own narratives and particularly by getting involved in social welfare/anti-poverty projects.

Gender is at the heart of Cynthia Rothschild's (2017) definition of fundamentalism as she notes that fundamentalism is 'generally grounded in a quest for political power that denies the rights of women, limits expressions of sexuality and regulates bodies' (p.7). Brekke (2012) notes the central place of gender inequalities within fundamentalist families, particularly through the ascription of separate gender roles and Cowden and Sahgal (2017) argue that fundamentalists are invested in creating 'a neo-patriarchal political order'. Quoting from Patricia Madigan (2011), Cowden and Sahgal draw attention to the fact that fundamentalist organisations are engaged with 'selectively retrieving documents, beliefs and practices… to shape a religious identity that will then become the basis of a recreated neo-patriarchal social and political order' (cited in Cowden and Sahgal, p. 17). As with Bhatt's (1997) work on Islamism and Hindutva, they note a pre-occupation with sexual relations and the way that the 'sexualised female body acts as a central signifier of the morally debased and corrupt nature of modernity' (p. 17), linked to an 'exaggerated masculinism, manifested by rituals of male bonding' (op cit). They further suggest a deep connection between women's increased participation in the labour market and resurgent fundamentalism, as this shift disrupted traditional patriarchal orders and has become a central complaint within fundamentalist narratives.

DEFINING RACIAL / WHITE SUPREMACIST, FAR RIGHT AND ALT-RIGHT MOVEMENTS

A central feature of white supremacist movements is their 'narrative of racial and/or cultural threat to a 'native' group arising from perceived alien groups within a society' (Lee, 2019: p. 1). Ben Lee (2019) offers the following typology: fascism as ultra-nationalism; neo-Nazism as espousing white supremacy, with examples of Combat 18, Blood and Honour, National Action, Stormfront and the Alt-Right; neo-fascism including the European New Right, Generation Identity; and populism, which is where he places the English Defence League (EDL). While some Far Right or Alt-Right organisations frame their arguments in terms of biology, others now rely on arguments about a 'culture clash' (Lee, 2019). Moreover, they share anti-minority views, claims about a demographic threat to white people, proliferation of conspiracy theories, authoritarianism and anti-Semitism. The stoking of grievances and the offer of a sense of community is a feature of their recruitment (Wendling, 2018). There are noticeable shifts in recent times on some of these issues, including an increased hostility to liberalism and democracy (Ebner, 2017). The Alt-Right is a newer formation, focused on culture and identity, seeking to change the terms of debates

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[2] https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/arts/english/research/currentprojects/feministdissent/

through 'cultural combat' or 'culture wars'. White nationalists' Twitter accounts are concentrated geographically in the US, UK and Canada (Berger, 2018). Disappointingly there is virtually nothing on gender or gender relations in much of this material.

Lee (2019) notes some points of tension: whether distinctions are framed in terms of biology or culture; the extent of commitment to neo-Nazism; whether groups espouse ethno-pluralism or white supremacy; and support for democracy. Another difference is the extent to which violence is legitimised, what Lee terms 'ideologically motivated violence' (p. 10).

One of the key scholars on the UK Far Right, Chris Allen (2014) argues that Britain First filled a void left by the implosions of the English Defence League (EDL) and the British National Party (BNP). Both organisations claim to protect what they term a British and Christian morality. They are considered more confrontational and militaristic than their forebearers. Here the notion of white victimhood recurs. With National Action, their organising has focused on local issues and places deemed 'hot spots'. They also have a strong online presence. Ebner (2017) adds to this that National Action are smaller, more agile and more militant than their forebearers, the EDL and BNP (p.63). All these organisations share an obsession with race, sexuality and gender relations: they are male dominated and hostile to homosexuality and inter-race relationships. Allen (2014) notes that Britain First are characterised by a 'radical traditionalism' with respect to gender roles but have also sought to increase female membership.

Paul Gilroy (2018) takes a more European focus, finding a preoccupation with the idea of a clash of civilisations, alongside a backwards looking notion of culture as heritage/nostalgia. He emphasises that much of this re-framed ideology is 'culture talk', connected to tech savvy 'neo-reactionaries with links in Silicon Valley' (p.4). Gilroy argues that European Far Right groups are not unified with respect to gender relations, that the core is a politics of race, what he terms the 'intersectional menace' of black men, as exemplified by the events in Cologne, and arguably also in the focus on sexual exploitation in the UK. His conceptualisation of gender is clearly limited to how women are framed within the ideology but his analysis of a demonised black masculinity is also about gender.

Ebner (2017) notes an increase in geek culture among the UK Far Right and engaging in online harassment, linking to the Alt-Right (p.71), which many distinguish through their extensive use of digital technologies, embeddedness on the internet through the creation of what is often referred to as the 'manosphere' engaged in explicit sexism and online harassment of women (Ebner, 2017; Lyons, 2017; Lux and Jordan, 2019). Like other extremist tendencies, the Alt-Right is inconsistent and fractured, including through a constant purging of dissent. However, Wendling (2018) argues that while they appear as a loose set of groups, individuals and ideologies, they are in fact 'held together by what they oppose; feminism, the Black Lives Matter movement, political correctness, a fuzzy idea they call 'globalism' and establishment politics of both right and left' (p.3).

Hartzell (2018) presents a helpful distinction between Alt-Right, far-right and pro-white, alongside an account of the emergence of the Alt-Right. He traces the origins to a small group of educated white men who met at a conference on the need for an alternative right in 2008: the Mencken Club defined themselves as against 'black nationalists, radical feminists and open border advocates', beginning with a

website AlternativeRight.Com in 2010. Their ambition was to present arguments couched as common sense, deploying memes with strong simple messages.

Lux and Jordan (2019) suggest that the Alt-Right specifically enmeshes white supremacy and misogyny, its proponents are described as 'militantly sexist', the key targets for membership are white males whose 'ethnic and gender identity are fragile' (op cit, p. 153). Wendling (2018) also highlights obsessions with race, sexuality and gender relations, especially 'the promise of sexual freedom offered by 'pick up artists' (p.7). Lyons (2017) argues that the Alt-Right see themselves as irreverent, while nonetheless having a strong belief in their inherent superiority, as men and as white people: 'Alt-Right ideology combines white nationalism, misogyny, anti-Semitism and authoritarianism in various forms and in political styles ranging from intellectual argument to violent invective' (p.2). Wendling (2018) makes some connections with the Alt-Right, including that there were UK threads on 4chan, noting: 'extremists identify young men who are frustrated and alienated and draw them in with core messages about things they really care about' (p. 192), stoking grievances and offering a sense of community.

Incels are a grouping within the Alt-Right, which has a clear male supremacist world view (Chokshi, 2018). Their name stems from a claim that they are 'involuntary celibates', deprived of access to sex, disadvantaged in what they term the sexual marketplace. It is here that the notion of the red pill – the creation of a masculinity to oppose feminism - becomes embedded. In a developing blog on Incels, Zimmerman et al (2018) make a strong argument for recognising the violent extremism in Incel ideology as 'a new violent political ideology based on a new wave of misogyny and white supremacy' (p. 1). While they are not organised in cells, much of the violence is 'premeditated, politically motivated and perpetrated against civilians' (p.2) and their online discussions can be viewed as the fuse for violence, an ideology that promotes violent solutions. Their rhetoric echoes that of white supremacists in terms of violent insurrection. The Southern Poverty Law Centre has added male supremacy to its tracking of hate discourse in the US and argue for inclusion in definitions of terrorism.

GENDER AND PREVENTING VIOLENT EXTREMISM

We ran four searches encompassing a combination of the search terms 'extremism or radicalisation or terrorism' + 'violence against women' / + 'sexual violence or sexual assault or sexual abuse or sexual harassment'/ + 'misogyny or sexism'/ + 'women's rights'. The search of academic databases returned a total of 609 items of which only 5 were relevant and accessible. 4 of these were on Islamism and are tackled in the other sections. A further 4 items were suggested by the funding agency or identified through the readings. This section considers what the literature tells us about the links between gender and terrorism and reflects on the recent United Nations (UN) and Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) commitment to developing a gendered approach to counter-terrorism work.

WHAT ARE THE LINKS BETWEEN GENDER AND TERRORISM?

The relationship between gender and terrorism remains under researched. There has been just one large scale quantitative analysis of the relationship between women's rights and domestic terrorism or transnational terrorism.

Harris and Milton (2016) attempted to test the relationship between gender and terrorism through a quantitative analysis involving a time-series cross-sectional dataset covering domestic terrorism, transnational terrorism and women's rights across 150 countries from 1979 to 2004. They investigated the hypothesis that 'when women's rights increase, the increased involvement of women in a country serves as a brake on the radicalisation process… [but also]… as women have more opportunities, there is less reason for them to engage in political violence' (p.61). They refer to women as potential 'veto players' that can ameliorate the rise of terrorism. Bearing in mind that the time frame of this study precedes ISIS, the authors extracted the following information from three datasets: the number of domestic terrorist attacks within a country (using the Global Terrorism Database); the nationality of individuals committing transnational terrorist attacks from a country (International Terrorism: Attributes of Terror Events dataset); and measurements for three categories of women's rights – economic, political and social rights (from the Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights dataset). They found a negative relationship between women's rights and domestic terrorism but no significant relationship between women's rights and transnational terrorism (i.e. where an individual travels abroad to engage in terrorist acts), suggesting transnational terrorist activity may be more related to foreign regimes and the rights of particular groups of people. Conversely, it's equally possible that the increase in terrorism is a direct response to the increase in formal gender equality, such as women's entry into paid employment, access to education, the right to vote and become political representatives.

GENDERING COUNTER-TERRORISM AND PREVENTING VIOLENT EXTREMISM WORK

Recent years have seen increased attention to a gendered approach to counter-terrorism (CT) and preventing violent extremism (PVE) work. The UN Security Council passed resolution 2242 in 2015 calling for 'greater integration by States of their agendas on women, peace and security' including on CT and PVE (OSCE, 2019, p. 12). This was followed by the UN Secretary General's Plan of Action, which places importance on women's role in preventing violent extremism. The UN resolution was adopted by the OSCE. The OSCE recently released a Handbook (2019) urging governments to implement a gendered approach by: involving women at every level of counter-terrorism work; identifying gendered strategies in terrorist recruitment (such as the way women are offered 'sisterhood' in response to their issues of belonging while the appeal to men is based on wealth and sexual gratification and a return to former male power); by analysing terrorist organisations through a gendered lens (such as by noting gender differences in victimisation and the gender dimensions of ideologies); and the different roles played by men and women within the organisations.

Through her study of gender and US counter-terrorism, Joana Cook (2019) argues that understandings of terrorist organisations necessarily inform the response to these organisations. It follows that a lack of understanding of the gendered practices and impacts of terrorist organisations will lead to flawed state responses to terrorism. By way of example, she notes that when women have not been visible on the front lines of terrorist organisations, particularly as fighters, their participation has tended to be overlooked and states have failed to respond to or prevent their recruitment. Yet in May 2020, women and children comprised 10,000 residents in the camps around Iraq and Syria, they have borne children

and they potentially raise the next generation of fighters but there has been little considered thinking on this.

The OSCE Handbook recognises women as 'well positioned to perceive negative trends in their communities because their rights and physical integrity are often the first stages of violent extremist ideologies' (p.52). It proposes a 'whole society' approach that goes beyond government agencies to gain the co-operation of civil society though there is no mention of the work undertaken by women's organisations over many decades. Moreover, the suggestion that law enforcement agencies look for links with women in civil society as part of community policing, could be read by many as state co-option into securitisation. The overall analysis is weak as it leads to the conflation of three very different issues into 'gender-based prevention' (p.34) - women as terrorists, women's role in prevention, and what a gender analysis of violent extremism and radicalisation should look like. Moreover, this leads to a simplistic policy recommendation that states should include women in their security agendas, without any reflection on the contradictions this might raise for those women and for women's organisations.

A number of feminists have raised concerns about the implications of a gendered approach to countering terrorism. Ndungu and Shadung (2017) suggest that supporting and working on women's equality and empowerment more widely can impact CT and PVE. They present the gender dimensions of CT and PVE work as three-fold: having a gender analysis of CT and PVE frameworks; understanding the connections between gender constructions, structural inequalities and violent extremism; and also paying attention to the gendered impacts of CT and PVE programmes. Echoing points made by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and Karima Bennoune (2008), Ndungu and Shadung reiterate that women are both victims of terrorism and victims of human rights abuses in CT and PVE practices. They remind us that 'reports of human rights violations resulting from CT measures' also give rise to grievances that 'are in turn used by terrorist organisations as fodder for propaganda aimed at recruitment' (p.6). They highlight two particular areas of caution. Firstly, governments should not seek to securitise gender equality as 'promoting the human rights of women and achieving gender equality are crucial ends in themselves' (p.8). This point is echoed by Idris and Abdelaziz (2017).

Secondly, they argue that the state should not subscribe to the conventional presumption that as mothers, sisters, partners or carers, women have some influence over the radicalisation of children and young people as, in reality, 'women are often denied the chance to play these roles… in most countries, male elders and religious leaders take the lead in key PVE interventions' (p.7). They propose that PVE looks more closely at fathers and their parenting as they have most authority in the family. Men ought to be engaged in challenging gender norms and encouraged to become invested in women's empowerment. Oudraat (2016) makes similar points, reminding us that women often do not have the power to influence these spaces as they are disrespected by both husbands and children. Oudraat adds that women's participation in violent extremism can stem from their experiences of inequality and discrimination both inside and outside the home.

Winterbotham and Pearson's (2016) research participants also raised concerns about the state shifting its responsibility for tackling terrorism on to mothers. Male participants 'felt that a role for fathers was

particularly desirable to influence sons' (p.61). They therefore argue that CT responses need to guard against securitising motherhood by putting the onus for countering violent extremism on women, or assuming that women are essentially peacemakers.

Idris and Abdelaziz (2017) propose a shift from positioning women as either passive victims in relation to violent extremism or as mothers with influence. They also note the limited attention to evaluating the gender impacts of CVE work. Drawing on a case study of tackling violent extremism in Bangladesh, Idris and Abdelaziz suggest that supporting women's economic empowerment and their work outside the home, may itself be an important counterpoint to fundamentalist mobilisation.

Lynn Davies (2008) reflects on the many ways that violent extremism is involved in constricting gender, in so far as it exploits gender stereotypes by promoting and reproducing a particular form of masculinity. However, she argues that PVE needs to extend beyond challenging forms of masculinity to involving schools and other spaces of education in challenging gender norms. This would encourage critical and dissenting questions and discussions that open up possibilities and push against reproduction of the same dominant masculinity that enables violence.

In summary, concerns about gendering CT and PVE work include: the promotion of women's rights as part of a security agenda rather than important objectives in and of themselves; the need to recognise power inequalities within communities; that women are both victims of terrorism and victims of human rights violations by counter-terrorism measures; and the need to guard against the misplaced expectation that women can influence men/boys adopting highly patriarchal ideologies. In turn this has prompted a call for fathers to play a key role in tackling radicalisation, leading us to reflect that rather than reading gender as only about the role of women, we should look at the role of men and constructions of masculinity.

PURITY AND IMPERIALISM

With the exception of Incels, all the political formations we looked at are pre-occupied with racial or religious purity and ways to stem what they see as the dilution of their group. Concerns with purity of racial origin or religious scripture and practice operate in conjunction with harking back to an earlier imperial age. Whether it's the Caliphate as in the case of ISIS, the British Empire as in the case of the UK Far Right, or the slogan Making America Great Again as in the case of the Alt-Right, these movements are imbued with a nostalgia for the past.

This pre-occupation with purity and nostalgia has clear gender dimensions. Women/girls are viewed as the defile-able and permeable points on the borders of the group and therefore in need of control and policing (Bhatt, 1996). Fundamentalists are pre-occupied with moral degeneracy and for them the purity of the group is embodied in women's behaviour, dress and contact with others. Gender also manifests as nostalgia for a time when men's authority and privileges were secure. For instance, the Alt-Right, contend that social inequalities are natural and social organisation should reflect the fact that white men are superior and therefore ought to be accorded privilege and respect (Lux and Jordan, 2019). Within this world view, feminism is understood as an attack on men's rights and status. Fundamentalists assert male headship of the family while the Alt-Right present men as privileged sexual actors. Across the board, the

idea that men's power and control may have waned is expressed through a sense of aggrieved victimhood. Segregation, whether the separation of men and women in daily life or arguments for men to reclaim their own spaces, is a mechanism invoked by ostensibly very different, and in some ways opposed groups of men.

INTIMATE PARTNER AND FAMILY VIOLENCE

With the exception of Smith (2019), Everytown for Gun Safety (2018), and the Department of Homeland Security (2017), there was a general lack of data on terrorist biographies that discussed histories of domestic and/or child abuse. In this section, we start with a detailed exploration of Joan Smith's book because that provides insights into the lives of religious and racial supremacists. We then focus on suggestions within the fundamentalism literature that women are being controlled within households. In contrast, the literature on Alt-Right membership, especially mass killers, seems to focus on childhood histories of living with domestic abuse, physical child abuse and being bullied at school. However, there has been little systematic research, so data is not robust and it remains an open question as to whether there are cross overs, with both groups experiencing some form of abuse in childhood and being themselves controlling and abusive in adult heterosexual relationships.

Since the 2017 attacks, there has been increasing attention to the fact that terrorist organisations are male dominated and/or male led. This emerging analysis makes connections between terrorism, forms of masculinity and violence against women (see Afzal, 2018; Gurumurthy, 2017; and Smith, 2017). Key among these is Joan Smith's (2019) book *Home Grown: How Domestic Violence Turns Men into Terrorists* in which she investigates the personal-political histories of men that committed acts of terrorism in the UK, France, Spain, USA and Australia. Smith finds that male perpetrators of terrorism share histories of interpersonal violence, whether as perpetrators and/or as victims. She connects terrorism as public violence with domestic abuse as private violence and also draws our attention to the long-term impacts of domestic violence on boys and young men. Though we dissent from her claim that 'detached parenting' and the absence of father figures are forms of abuse and neglect, Smith provides a compelling account of the multiple ways that violence against women and girls - including domestic and sexual violence, stalking, harassment, and sexual exploitation - feature in the lives of a wide range of men involved in public acts of terror. This leads her to draw parallels between the desensitisation and power involved in perpetration of domestic abuse and acts of public violence. She suggests that paying attention to the private violence of potential terrorists could be an indication of whether they will commit public acts of violence and states, 'men who are used to beating, kicking, choking and stabbing women at home are considerably further along the road towards committing public acts of violence' (p.6). She contends that 'hatred of women and a history of domestic violence are key indicators of dehumanisation, a process of seeing other people as objects' (p.9) and further that domestic violence is 'one of the highest risk factors' (p. 11), citing support by Nazir Afzal that 'the female relatives of extremists are often their first victims' (p.275).

Moreover, she argues that male terrorists are connected by cultures of misogyny and 'toxic masculinity' and she draws connections between gang affiliation, sexual exploitation, and jihadist recruitment. In this vein she refers to ISIS as a gang and a rapist state for its active recruitment of young men involved in

criminal gangs and/or sexual offenders and their justification of sexual violence. She berates the way that counter-terrorism analysis and left perspectives on terrorism have overlooked gender and the VAWG dimensions of these biographies in favour of a focus on religious ideology or racism and foreign policy. She argues that terrorism 'has roots in the family and misogyny' (p.268), the majority of attackers that she discusses in her book had histories of violence towards partners but many of them had not been prosecuted for these offenses. In many cases their wives and girlfriends had not been assisted by the state, they had to rely on private solutions to escape the violence. For these reasons, she argues that the answer to tackling terrorism lies in tackling domestic violence. She advocates a raft of measures to tackle the normalisation of domestic violence, to raise awareness of the links between VAWG and other forms of violence, to improve support services for victims and improve investigations that can lead to increased convictions.

However, one should guard against any deterministic or reductive approach to terrorism. Three issues limit Joan Smith's claims. Firstly, she relies on journalistic accounts and a government report on the men, which may have focused on particular aspects of their lives while ignoring others. Indeed, she does not adequately address those situations that do not match her thesis and some of her coverage is unsatisfactory. For instance, she notes the poverty and racism experienced by the Kouachi brothers yet decides to focus on the fact that their father was absent and their mother died at a young age. There is no VAWG detail on 'Jihadi John' to explain his early recruitment into a local gang and his later involvement in acute levels of violence. The roots of Elliot Rodger's rage is not to be found in his stable middle-class family. Similarly, she provides very little detail of any household problems for the three high achieving Tower Hamlets girls that travelled to Syria; her explanation of their online 'grooming' to escape a 'culture clash' is simplistic. Instead she turns her attention to the way that ISIS are involved in promoting sexual violence and recruiting sexual offenders.

Secondly, Smith draws a single uncomplicated line between the actions of white men involved in mass shootings in the USA and Islamists involved in a range of attacks in the UK and Europe, supposedly pinned together by their hatred for women and deep-seated rage. Thirdly, she promotes the Adverse Childhood Experiences (ACEs) framework which scores particular experiences in childhood - especially those that occur in the first three years of a child's life - and uses that score to predict negative outcomes later in life or to explain negative behaviour in retrospect. At its extreme ACEs is being used to determine insurance policies and to determine pregnant women's abilities to parent their unborn child (Eaton, 2019). This framework has been rigorously critiqued for: relying on very limited scientific evidence (Edwards et al, 2017); being used as a predictive model to impose the likelihood of poor outcomes on certain children (Eaton, 2019); promoting a deficit model of childhood and the family (Eaton, 2019; Macvarish and Lee, 2019); pathologizing individuals and families while completely disregarding socio-economic and environmental contexts (Mcewen and Gregerson, 2019; Treanor, undated; Walsh et al, undated), such as poverty, racism, experiences of prison and a lack of employment opportunities which may have had as much, if not greater, impact on the development of these men and boys and continued to act as barriers to their progression.

Although Smith shines a spotlight on gender and violence in the private sphere, one could argue that gender becomes over-emphasised and other factors downplayed, such as religious conviction, opposition to dissident voices, experiences of racism and poverty, and foreign policy. In her account, terrorism is another form of men's violence. As we show throughout this literature review, religious and racial supremacists are certainly engaged in discriminatory projects that seek to undermine and marginalise women/girls, but they are equally targeting male dissenters and secularists (the Bangladeshi bloggers is a case in point) and/or non-white men (as in the case of Darren Osborne, the Finsbury Park Mosque attacker). Smith's analysis may not be able to explain the actions of Roshonara Chaudhry, for instance, a high achieving teenager so angered by the War on Terror that she stabbed her local MP Stephen Timms after lengthy engagement with fundamentalists online. Chaudhry then refused legal representation at trial because of her unwillingness to legitimise secular law or engage with anything but religious law. Moreover, the brutalisation of women is not evenly spread for Islamist organisations – there is a great deal of evidence of sex discrimination (and here Smith's argument that ISIS is inherently misogynistic runs true) but there is little information on domestic abuse or intimate partner violence, rather the violence is directed at all (male and female) members of the other group. Of course, Smith could be right that this is because little attention has been paid to the private sphere.

FUNDAMENTALIST FAMILIES AND MALE HEADSHIP

With the exception of Joan Smith (2019), there is little detail on intimate partner violence or histories of abuse within the literature on fundamentalism and fundamentalist actors. Instead there is considerable discussion of the use of religion, religious laws and gender segregation to justify inequality within the family and to condone intimate partner violence.

Torkel Brekke (2012) discusses male headship of the Christian fundamentalist family as the foundation for gender inequality within the household; women are expected to be nurturers while men are breadwinners and decision-makers. He explains how Christian fundamentalists use the story of genesis to argue that men and women were made differently: they draw on key passages from the New Testament 'to legitimate what they believe are correct principles on which to build gender roles in everyday life. The two most prominent principles are difference and complementarity' (p.239). Women are positioned as nurturing mothers concerned with the home while men are strong leaders and breadwinners. Moreover, they have different sexual instincts – referring to Evangelical sex manuals he explains that 'men are generally thought to be less in control of their impulses and wives are responsible for satisfying their husband's biological needs' (p.240) and these differences are the basis of a good marriage. He also highlights the importance of 'authority' and 'obedience' in fundamentalist discourse. When fundamentalists acknowledge problems within marriages this is assumed to be a consequence of men failing to assert sufficient authority.

Echoing some of Brekke's points, Foss and Warnke (2003) make clear links between intimate partner violence and the gender roles that are invoked and supported by the religious community. They look at the experiences of domestic violence among Fundamentalist Protestant Christian (FPC) women in the USA and note that this is condoned by family structures, religious beliefs and group norms promoted by

religious parishes. FPC communities espouse traditional family norms, namely male headship of the family and women's inferiority, as the will of God. Women's suffering is seen as a Christian virtue. These scriptural arguments are supported by practices that privilege the position of men in the Church and promote differential roles for men and women such that men are ordained as dominant while women are subordinated. They are marked by essentialist and reductive ascriptions to women as nurturers and home makers and men as bread winners. Domestic violence is exacerbated by the fact that women in FPC households have less access to resources, they are encouraged to pray and stay in the marriage: '(w)hen problems such as domestic violence occur, a woman may be encouraged to wait, pray, and live a pious life to fulfil her supportive role as a helpmate to her husband' (p. 18). They also suggest that violence occurs as a way to push back against any challenges that women present, for instance if she wants a career outside the home or refuses to submit to her husband's total authority. While this is a common feature in intimate partner violence, here it is shored up by 'a God-given right to dominate and control his wife or to punish those family members who resist his guidance and direction' (p. 18). Moreover, victim-blaming within the church could lead the woman to believe that she has caused this 'conflict' by not submitting to the will of God: 'women from FPC backgrounds are often the least likely to believe that physical violence against them is wrong' (p. 19). They also note the pressure on FPC women to reconcile with abusive partners. Unfortunately, the strength of these insights are undercut by a lack of information about the data that the authors are basing these claims on, one assumes they are narrating their experiences of counselling FPC women but it is not clear.

The patriarchal family is central to several religious fundamentalist projects. Himani Bannerji (2006) discusses its importance for the cultural project of the Hindu Right in India, which is invested in the construction of an authentic Hindu identity/traditions and perpetuating these as 'common sense'. The Hindu Right is itself a family (and known as the Sangh Parivar) comprising different sections (BJP, RSS, Bajrang Dal, VHP, ABVP, and the World Hindu Council) that also help the whole body legitimately perpetrate violence. The electoral wing of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) distances itself from violence by the other sections, particularly the Rashtriya Swayam Sevak Sangha (RSS) cadres. It claims that RSS cadre become violent because of their intense passion and commitment to defending the religion against foreign invasion and moral degeneracy. As with other fundamentalist movements, the Sangh Parivar is led by an anxiety over male position, moral degeneracy and sexual relations (see Bhatt, 1996). From Bannerji's perspective, 'violence is an authoritarian code and is mediated and expressed through the ideals of the high caste patriarchal family' (p.380): the family in Hindutva ideology is hierarchical, patriarchal (the father is at the head) and depends on women's subservience and caste properties. Bannerji states: 'Women's chastity and maternity are particularly important for their reproductive capacity as vessels for the nurturing of the Hindu race and its purity' (p.381). Violence against women and girls follows on from the power afforded to the Hindu male to punish 'any violations of morality' (p.382): violence is used to enforce patriarchal codes of conduct.

Bina Srinivasan (2004) echoes these points and notes that Hindu women are projected as cultural carriers, responsible for the reproduction of Hindu tradition, and the communal property of Hindus. This is why Hindutva is diametrically opposed to feminism – it completely denies women's bodily or other autonomy

and consigns women to property and the fulfilment of particular duties and responsibilities. She elaborates:

> Women are perceived to be the property of the community, of men, and therefore have to subscribe to the appropriate rules. Women are not seen as autonomous beings, which is why the issue of community 'honor' being tied up with women's bodies is so crucial… …Women's bodies, thus, are markers of the identity that fundamentalism so painstakingly seeks to create. Therefore, dress codes become important, along with marriage alliances and the required feminine 'modesty' (read submission). In addition, as biological and cultural reproducers women are bound to bear the adequate number of male children (warriors, so to speak), who will rise to defend the community/nation-in-the-making against the enemy. Women are also trained to step into 'warrior' roles as and when the time arrives (Srinivasan, 2004: p. 139).

Violence against women and girls is part and parcel of defining the contours of community, race, religion and nation. Varma (2017) argues that it is an articulation of the 'masculinist' Hindu Right project, and it is also being used in a punitive way to deal with anyone that is seen to transgress norms/rules.

Moreover, fundamentalist groups advocate religious family laws and codes of conduct to govern inter-personal relationships. Gender norms are reproduced through the invocation of a pure/authentic script or set of legal tenets that they claim were drawn from religious scripture or religious leadership. With the Hindu Right, Varma (2017) notes the 'repeated invocation of the Manusmriti, the ancient Sanskrit legal text that underwrites some of the most conservative and patriarchal aspects of Hindu "law"' (p.71). In relation to Sikh fundamentalism, Dhaliwal (2016) notes repeated references to the Rehat Maryada, a moralistic and patriarchal code of conduct, and the ways it is used to enforce women's chastity and subservience to their husbands. On Islamist movements, Karima Bennoune (1995) argued long ago that the push for religious laws was spurred by fundamentalist groups, divesting women of equal status and basically infantilising them by making them the property of the husband and family, removing all autonomy, and institutionalising discrimination against women/girls in matters of divorce and inheritance.

In all of the accounts of Islamist involvement in sexual exploitation and sexual violence discussed in the next section, there is little information on the personal lives of ISIS men and women and whether the violence perpetrated against other groups extends to ISIS men's treatment of their wives. The little reference there is, portrays them as equally invested in violence against Yezidi women, calling for their brutalisation and their murder. There is also only passing reference to the treatment of Yezidi men. We still know very little about the experiences of 'jihadi brides' but Saltman and Smith's (2016) research offers some insights. They note that ISIS husbands and wives have clearly differentiated roles and physical spheres of existence, as the wife is expected to support her husband in his fight and to reproduce the ISIS nation through childbearing (and this is why the researchers refer to them as 'migrants' rather than as 'fighters'). They find that ISIS women's lives are mired by early forced marriage, polygamy, short-lived marriages and widowhood, pressure to remarry and seclusion following the death of a husband. Only one of the jihadi bride cases that they considered had any role outside the home, as a female doctor, and this

was because strict segregation necessitates female medics. Unfortunately, the information on their personal or family histories before migration is very limited but what is there indicates that women join ISIS at a very young age, they come from conservative religious backgrounds (including from families where male relatives are already linked to terrorist organisations), and they express hatred towards the west. Echoing the sentiments of Lyn Davies (discussed above), the authors suggest that teaching young people to develop their critical skills could strengthen their resilience to terrorist recruitment. Seren de Leede (2018) also looked at cases of young European women that joined ISIS. She is the only author to suggest that the radicalisation of young women could be related to abuse at home and the search for independence from that home environment. However, there is no insight into this in the cases that she goes on to discuss.

ALT-RIGHT AND HISTORIES OF VIOLENCE/ABUSE

Many of the sources which link the Alt-Right to VAW are journalistic commentaries and, apart from specific case studies the connections made are often vague and even, at times, rhetorical rather than analytical. Duriesmith et al (2018) note that both the mass killers in Australia had histories of gender-based violence. Zimmerman et al (2018) record histories of domestic violence and sexual violence in the lives of the men who committed the Westminster, Nice, Boston marathon, Sydney café attacks (p.2) and suggest these were linked across a spectrum of 'militant misogyny' and 'violent ideological masculinity' (p.3). Brueck and LeBowitx (2019), for example, make the claim that many mass killers have also committed VAW, threatened it or disparaged women. This is a very wide frame for making the connections, in which any form of sexism is equated with acts of violence against women. However, there is some continuity in the journalistic commentaries on the links between the Alt-Right and VAW, with most of the focus being on histories of abuse in childhood.

Kalish and Kimmel (2010) produced one of the earliest papers which explores school and university shootings and suicide as a 'violent enactment of masculinity' (p.451), fuelled by a sense of righteous rage (p.463). It is in this paper that the concept of 'aggrieved entitlement' is introduced (p.454). Most of the young white men who killed had histories of bullying and 'gay baiting 'at school, they were marginalised as boys and this was tolerated by the institutions, as part of a gendered culture (p.462) that led them to feel both victimised and superior.

A report by Everytown for Gun Safety (2018) is more precise, arguing that the majority (86%, n=224) of mass shootings in the US between 2009-2017 were related to domestic and/or family violence, with more than half (54%, n=94) including the murder of a current/former intimate partner or a family member. Here again the connection to violence against women is conflated, this time with violence to a family member. They cite data from a 2017 Department for Homeland Security report, where almost half of the cases of violent extremism in the preceding year had been motivated by personal grievances, perceived slights by peers and family members: again, the range of what might be included here is extensive. The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) (cited in Kimmel, 2013) used 44 life histories as the basis of a study on mass killers, and they contend that these men were more likely to have experienced child mistreatment especially physical abuse and neglect, when

compared to overall prevalence rates (p.9). Other factors which were considered significant included: having a parent in prison (30%); parental abandonment (32%) and parental substance abuse (48%). In terms of the men themselves, over half had histories of truancy and poor educational achievement (both 54%) and almost two thirds (64%) had used drugs and alcohol before they were 16.

Eleanor Boatman (2018) in *The Kids are Alt-Right* explores what the existing literature tells us about the emotional foundations of Alt-Right membership: a sense of strength, confidence, and being in control. She suggests that those attracted to the Alt-Right are holding some form of emotional pain from childhood trauma, of not belonging, discrimination, bullying, isolation, feelings of injustice, anger and fear, which are mobilised into a sense of identity and entitlement. Violence becomes a legitimate route 'to address a perceived injustice and to send a political message of their perceived problems' (p.6). Michael Kimmel (2013) echoes some of these arguments suggesting that sexual abuse, physical abuse and/or bullying leaves many young men feeling sad, miserable and ashamed: this is a space where Alt-Right arguments can gain purchase. While such experiences of violence and abuse should not be treated as predictive, they do suggest that these young men feel disenfranchised and alienated, and are searching for identity: the offer of an account which tells them they have been discriminated against as white and as men becomes a vector for the adoption of social dominance beliefs framed through a sense of grievance, as victims of a changing culture, which has undermined white masculinity.

Steve Crimando (2019) terms this 'gender-based terrorism' and argues that there is a familiar path from radicalisation to mobilisation, which includes the following factors: the "grievance collector"; chronic victimhood; externalized blame for their unhappiness or distress; relationship problems; depression or withdrawal; paranoia, or concerns that others are trying to cause harm or limit their success; hopelessness; rage, anger, seeking revenge; feeling trapped and having no purpose in life; self-identification as a warrior; pseudo commando to advance a particular cause or belief system; militarized style of dress or speech; expression that violence is necessary or justified. A series of indicators unique to Incels are proposed: self–identification as an Incel; adoption of Incel terminology and worldview; empathy with others who have committed violent misogyny; participation in chat rooms and online communities espousing violence toward women or successful men; extreme social awkwardness, social anxiety, or body dysmorphia; perception of unattractiveness or undesirability; overt anger or resentment toward women; indications of pre-operational hostile surveillance of places frequented or populated primarily by women.

McCulloch et al (2019) extend this analysis to lone wolf terrorism, making a strong critique of how gender has not been a key analytical lens: that criminological work has taken for granted that these actors are men. They explore the ways in which public and private terrorism (by which they mean intimate partner violence) have been disconnected, whereas they could and should be seen as a continuum. They cite feminist criminologists who have offered this analysis (Fitzgibbon et al in 2018; Pain, 2012). They argue that there is a 'violence overlap' (p.4), which needs to be attended to and argue that private terrorism should be considered a national security issue. McCulloch et al (2019) concur, arguing that IPV is the most common form of violence encountered by criminal justice systems but it is underplayed by the security

industry (p.3). Failure to recognise private/interpersonal violence as 'real' violence leads to failures of the state to protect.

Valesik and Reid (2018) draw on the Eurogang and political science definitions of gangs, as a route to explore appropriate interventions. They suggest that Alt-Right groupings and white power youth groups present an alternative model to how gangs have been understood to date. The analysis explores whether what is known about gang membership may also apply to right wing groups: the creation of group life spaces which offer belonging and safety and the use of symbolic and actual violence to police the boundaries of the group. They ask whether the findings from work on skinheads in earlier decades – that they were likely to live with a single-parent and with 'domestic discord' (a potential reference to domestic violence) - can also be seen in lives of young men who identify with the Alt-Right.

SEXUAL VIOLENCE

Sexual violence is a significant part of supremacist narratives and activism, it is part and parcel of defining the contours of community, race, religion and nation. Sexual violence is also used in a punitive way to deal with anyone that is seen to transgress norms/rules, as a form of violence it continues to hang over women as a threat to stop them transgressing prescribed norms. Sexual violence takes different forms with religious and racial supremacist organisations. This section addresses five specific manifestations: the policing of sexual relations by Christian, Hindu and Sikh fundamentalist organisations; the way that sexual violence is used by fundamentalists to attack designated enemy groups; the involvement of Christian and Muslim fundamentalist groups in sexual exploitation and trafficking; the way that sexual exploitation has been instrumentalised by both white supremacists (EDL and National Action) and Sikh fundamentalists to create an unprecedented alignment on anti-Muslim racism; and the use of rejection violence and rape lists by Incels.

POLICING THE IN-GROUP AND AVENGING THE ENEMY

As pointed out in the previous section, Christian fundamentalists assert biologically determined difference in sexual instincts, with men depicted as 'less in control of their impulses and wives are responsible for satisfying their husband's biological needs' (Brekke, 2012: 240).

Moreover, Barker and Galliher's (2017) quantitative study with USA college students at the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints found higher rates of sexual coercion among young women than reports of perpetration among young men, indicating a lack of recognition of sexual violence or a sense of sexual entitlement. They undertook one of the few studies on violence against women and fundamentalism that involves primary research. Their quantitative analysis with college students (male and female, aged 18 and over) affiliated with the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (either current members or having been raised in this religion) involved scale questions about religious fundamentalist values, attitudes towards women, a 22 item Ambivalent Sexism Inventory that measures hostile and benevolent sexism, a scale survey using the Illinois Rape Myth Acceptance Scale, and a sexual experiences survey. They also gave participants space to report sex acts which were scored by the authors according to information on coercion. They had 208 responses (77 male and 131 female). They compared the findings with data using

the same scales within broader populations. The authors argue that this Church (abbreviated as LDS) promotes chastity before marriage, male headship of the family and gender segregation. Their discussion also suggests the teaching is a conducive context for victim-blaming; '(y)oung men and young women are taught that women are primarily responsible for keeping a young man's thoughts and actions clean' (p.318). The article offers some interesting findings on the way that religious beliefs impact sexual attitudes and experiences. They found higher rates of reports of sexual coercion among women than reports of perpetration by men. Also, an adherence to traditional roles mediated the connection between 'dogmatic, religiously fundamentalist beliefs and acceptance of rape mythology for both men and women… (and also)… between religious fundamentalism and sexual assault behaviours for men' (p.316).

A common theme in the literature on religious supremacists is the way that sex and sexuality shape the contours of their projects. 'Our women', 'our men', 'other women' and 'other men' are differentially sexualised. The literature on Islamists, Hindu Right, and Sikh fundamentalists suggests that they all desexualise women within the group and divest them of any sexual autonomy, making them reproductive properties of the group. For instance, with Hindutva, where the Hindu woman is 'seen as pristine and pure', the other woman is demonised through depictions of her as highly sexualised (Srinivasan, 2004: p. 140), she is deemed unworthy of respect or protection. Under Hindutva there is no space for sexual relations outside of marriage and moreover, the Hindu Right have been vociferous supporters of section 377 of the penal code (now overturned) which prohibits same sex relations (Varma, 2017). In Hindu and Sikh fundamentalist discourse, Hindu and Sikh men are charged with repressing the volatile sexuality of Muslim men.

The Hindu Right's 'other' are primarily Muslims, but also Christians, Dalits, feminists and secularists. Himani Bannerji (2006) writes about key events in the rise of the Hindu Right in India sparking violence against Muslims in Ayodhya in 1992 and then in Gujarat in 2002. As Chetan Bhatt (1996) pointed out, the Sangh Parivar is led by an anxiety over male position, degeneracy and therefore sexual relations. Bannerji argues that chastity and physical strength are central pre-occupations (reflected in the extreme in discussions about saving semen), she states: '(w)omen's chastity and maternity are particularly important for their reproductive capacity as vessels for the nurturing of the Hindu race and its purity' (p.381). This anxiety about degeneracy and sexual relations plays out in the treatment of women, Muslims and 'foreigners'. The family is 'the training ground for Hindutva masculinity deployed in riots and pogroms, which destroys the families of 'others', unleashes rapes and foeticide of Muslims, kills Christian missionaries and rapes nuns' (p.380). Particularly brutal acts of sexual violence against Muslim women were central to the Gujarat genocide in 2002. These attacks are further justified by distinctions between 'the good maternal and the bad sexual woman' (p.381) as non-procreative sex is frowned upon and the subjects of Hindutva hatred (Muslims, Christians, westerners) are depicted as unchaste. The Hindu male is charged with repressing the volatile sexuality of the men in these other groups.

Through a discourse analysis of events and speeches, Bina Srinivasan (2004) reports that Hindutva relies on a mythical golden age where Hindu women allegedly lived free from the fear of violence. They blame foreign occupiers – Muslims and westerners –for the 'corruption of morality'. Echoing Bannerji, she argues that the Hindu Right's 'them and us' frame depicts Muslims as a specific sexual threat to Hindu women.

The fiction around this enabled the assault on Muslims in Gujarat in 2002. Like Bannerji, Srinivasan refers to Hindutva's aggressive masculinity but also the way that sexual violence is used to stoke anxiety of a threat and brutality is used to emasculate Muslim men in order to make them pay for alleged historical crimes against Hindu women. 'Other women' bear the brunt of Hindutva enmity and the woman in the enemy community represents that community's ability to consolidate and reproduce itself, and therefore becomes a legitimate target.

Rashmi Varma (2017) argues that rape has become a 'potent weapon of the Hindu Right' as rapes are filmed and the visuals are circulated as vindication, such as the rapes of Muslim women in 1992 and 2002, of Christians in 2007-2008, and the gang rape of targeted women including a Catholic nun. Without diminishing the importance of the large scale brutal sexual violence inflicted by Hindu Right activists against Muslim women in Gujarat in 2002 and in other parts of India against Christian and Dalit women, Varma (2017) argues that sexual violence is not an aberration, it is 'a mode of communalism' and 'a constitutive part of the Hindu Right project' (p. 1). She argues that sexual violence is the 'means to impose a masculinist, dominant caste, communal and nationalist version of the nation' (p.59).

Varma (2017) identifies three particular uses of sexual violence in relation to the Hindutva project:

> a) sexual violence as part of the state project of controlling and disciplining rebellious populations and territories and as a weapon of war; b) as a means of political and social assertion, as a mode of maintaining caste, communal and class power, and as part of the dominant national imaginary of the place of women in society through regulating public and private divisions; and c) as a means of structuring family power, intimacy and sexuality and the patriarchal order that determines the remit of each, including controlling women's bodies and reproductive choices (Varma, 2017: p.60).

Varma also explains that on an everyday basis, *khap panchayats* (patriarchal systems of community resolution) have extended to '*khap* mentality' such that there is now widespread patriarchal vigilantism involving a wide range of people in disciplining women and girls that are thought to be crossing the line. This is particularly evident in the Hindu Right's use of the term 'love jihad' to reflect their anxiety that Muslim men's relationships with Hindu women are essentially about Muslims grooming 'our girls'. Hindu women in relationships with Muslim men are seen as having been duped by these men who are only using love as a ploy to convert them to Islam. This vigilantism extends to the monitoring and imposition of dress codes as claims are made about an authentic Hindu attire versus inauthentic westernisation.

The literature on Hindutva groups and on ISIS (discussed in the next section) suggests that they are using sexual violence as a weapon in order to: assert their dominance; to humiliate and destroy the enemy; and as a weapon of terror in the knowledge that women and communities live in fear of the threat of sexual violence (Ensler, 2015; Kibble, 2016; Kizhiland and Noll-Husong, 2017; Nicolaus and Yuse, 2017; Srinivasan, 2004; Sverdlov, 2017; Varma, 2017). Sexual violence is justified as part of an attack on the identity of the opposing group, presumably that women are vested with that identity and so violation of women becomes a strike at the heart of the opponent's identity and property. Sexual violence is also a form of terror and perpetrators are keenly aware of the long term impact of sexual violence on their victims in

relation to shame, stigma, loss of virginity and therefore chastity, fear of sexually transmitted infections, many of which are borne true by the problems women/girls experience in re-integrating in to their communities as they are viewed as posing a risk to that community and also suspected of complicity with their perpetrators.

However, with the exception of Chetan Bhatt's work, most of the writing on the Hindu Right focuses on the Indian context and offers little on how this plays out within Hindu communities in the UK. One specific piece on Sikh fundamentalism in the UK demonstrates that similar themes do chime with events in the UK context and across religious fundamentalisms.

In the wake of the 2016 Sikh Youth UK protests against Sikh wedding ceremonies for inter-faith couples, Dhaliwal (2016) contested the claims of protestors that they were not opposed to inter-faith relationships per se and were simply iterating a rule that Sikh marriage ceremonies should be reserved for baptised Sikhs. Dhaliwal pointed to evidence that their members had also spoken out against pre-marital relationships, particularly condemning relationships between Sikhs and non-Sikhs. Moreover, they focused almost entirely on Sikh women (not men) marrying out of the group. As with the points made above, Dhaliwal's article demonstrates that reference to religious laws or codes of conduct (in this case the *Rehat Maryada*) are used to enforce women's chastity and subservience to their husbands. These demonstrations against inter-faith marriage are reflections of a growing power among Sikh fundamentalist forces in the UK and reflect their pre-occupation with policing the sexual autonomy of Sikh women. Alongside these demonstrations, the Sikh Awareness Society (SAS) had been fuelling claims that Muslim men are preying on Sikh girls, with little or no evidence. In this campaign against 'grooming', SAS perpetuate a similar claim to the Hindu Right, that the threat of the Muslim man dates back to the Moghul era and the invasion of their homeland. In this way, their campaign against 'grooming' is firmly lodged within a narrative about the eternal battle between minoritized Sikhs and dominant Muslim invaders, with Sikh men valiantly fighting to restore the morality and honour of their *quam* (fictional Sikh nation) to an era that predates contact with Muslims.

Sexuality also features with National Action arguing for the reintroduction of Section 28 and a pederast[3] charge. Moreover, national attention to sexual exploitation has been instrumentalised by the Far Right to police the boundaries of their group. Allen (2017) points to the ways that National Action drew on sexual exploitation and grooming gangs to ferment racism. In fact, the instrumentalisation of sexual exploitation led to an anti-Muslim alliance between Far Right and Sikh fundamentalist forces as SAS joined with the English Defence League (EDL) in a united claim that they are protecting their girls from depraved Muslim men. SAS enabled the EDL's unprecedented access to gurdwaras up and down the country. Importantly, Sikh fundamentalist organisations have been less concerned about sexual abuse being perpetrated by men within Sikh communities, as can be seen in their campaign to shut down Gurpreet Bhatti's play *Behzti* about power and the perpetration of sexual violence by members of religious institutions.

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[3] A specific homosexual sexual offence, all of which were removed in the Sex Offences Act 2003.

SEXUAL EXPLOITATION AND TRAFFICKING

There is also evidence of both Christian and Islamist organisations trafficking girls and young women for early/forced marriage and offering them as a 'reward' to male group members. The largest chunk of the literature focuses on ISIS and its treatment of Yezidi women but there is also some information on Boko Haram and on Christian sects. There may well be continuities in the UK with child sexual exploitation.

Quek (2016) analysed over ninety written submissions to the Supreme Court of British Columbia between 2010 and 2011 in a case considering the constitutionality of Canadian laws banning polygamy. These documents include testimonies from those practicing polygamy and other 'records of women's experiences' submitted from the USA (p.20). Quek produces a feminist reading of these documents and, taking the Palermo Protocol and its three aspects – the act, the means, and the purpose - as her framework, she argues that there is evidence of both cross-border and internal trafficking. Specific documents submitted to the Court identified 27 girls (as young as 12) being driven across the border by their parents to be married to one particular sect leader. Individual testimonies reflect similar experiences of internal trafficking within the USA. As regards the means, Quek notes the Palermo Protocol recognises trafficking where there has been an abuse of power, use of force, and/or a payment to illicit consent. In this regard, church leaders use their power to pressurise young women into marriages with much older men and bolstered by the church's emphasis on women submitting to the authority of men. This is exacerbated by the fact that children are educated within these communities and not exposed to alternative perspectives. Gender segregation is a key mechanism for enabling this indoctrination, as Quek points out: '(t)he religious indoctrination of girls with the values of obedience and submissiveness to men places women in an especially vulnerable position to be trafficked, as victims may not see themselves as having any other options than to submit to the marriage that has been arranged for them' (p.30).

In terms of the purpose of these marriages, Quek argues that they are simultaneously about sexual exploitation, forced labour (as domestic servitude) and forced reproduction (birth control is not permitted and women are expected to produce one baby a year). Through these marriages, young women are made available for the 'sexual servicing of men' and 'the sheer number of women available for male sexual use places individual women in particular conditions of vulnerability and competition with other women' (Quek, 2016: p.30-31). Quek likens this to brothel conditions. Working with testimonial data, she describes the absolute power of the men in the household and the need for women to resign themselves to sexual submission in order to access money or status in a space in which they are competing with several other women (see also Rehman, 2013 for more discussion on polygyny). In exchange for handing over their daughters, the parents pick up trade within these communities as they come to be seen favourably and acquire status for subscribing to the church leaders' proposals. The first hand testimonies indicate a number of ways that young women are made more vulnerable through forms of non-physical coercion, namely the threat of 'blood atonement' where a member of a community can be killed if the behaviour of someone within that community is considered unacceptable. Refusal to marry can be one such example of unacceptable behaviour.

A considerable amount has been written on ISIS' sexual enslavement of Yezidi women. The literature searches on ISIS (and its various manifestations) and the gender/violence related combinations mostly returned articles on sexual violence (11 relevant items almost entirely on the sexual enslavement of Yezidi women) and on women's recruitment to ISIS (10 relevant items discussed in the next section). There is little by way of information on the experiences of ISIS wives and intimate partner violence.

ISIS institutionalised the marketisation and sexual enslavement of Yezidi women by creating a Bureau of Sex Slavery, which subsequently published a manual on Best Practices for Sex Slavery including rules on how and when it is permissible to beat your sex slave (Ensler, 2015). As Ensler notes, a leaked document on the pricing of sex slaves revealed that: '(f)orty- to 50-year-old women were priced at $41, 40-year-olds at $62, 20- to 30-year-olds at $82, and 1 to 9-year-old children at $165. Women over 50 weren't even listed. They had no market value' (p.4).

Kibble (2016) explores the ISIS magazine *Dabiq* and highlights the way that ISIS justify their brutal tactics, including the use of rape, beheading, drowning, and burning alive. He finds that, where possible, ISIS use verses of the Quran to justify a clear hierarchical distinction between 'real' believers and non-believers and to justify the killing of anyone that is not following their version of Islam. Kibble quotes from a *Dabiq* article using Quranic verses, to illustrate this point: '"Then, when the Sacred months are over, kill the idolaters wherever you find them, take them [as captives], besiege them, and lie in wait for them" (9:5); "Fight those among the People of the Book [Jews and Christians] who do not believe in Allah and the Last Day ..." (9:29); "O Prophet, fight the unbelievers and their hypocrites and be stern with them. Their abode is Hell, and what a terrible fate" (9:73)' (as cited by Kibble, 2016: p.30). These verses are used to argue that Islam is not a passive religion. This has also justified the killing of people that do not follow ISIS' version of Islam, namely Shia Muslims, and the forced conversion and tax on Christians, leading to the mass displacement of Christians in the area as they fled their homes. The following Quranic verses have been used to justify beheadings, a significant tactic: "Strike [those who disbelieve] upon their necks and strike every fingertip of theirs" (8:12); "When you meet the unbelievers, strike their necks till you have bloodied them" (47:4) (as cited by Kibble, 2016, p.30-31). The magazine justifies the use of child soldiers on the basis that 'Muhammad used child soldiers at the Battle of Badr' (p.31).

Moreover, on rape and sexual slavery, Kibble argues that women of non-Abrahamic communities have been a specific target for ISIS – he estimated that at the time of writing 700 Yezidi men had been executed and thousands of Yezidi women had been enslaved. The rape and enslavement of women is justified on the basis of quotes from religious texts but also claims about the life of Muhammad. In particular, ISIS claim Muslim law entitles them to kill and enslave apostates and that Muhammad justified 'putting people in chains' until they convert to Islam and his own practice of enslaving four women, a practice that was followed by Muhammad's companions who had as many as nine slaves. Women writing for *Dabiq*, such as Umm Sumayyah al-Muhajirah, use the following Quranic text - "The believers have prospered ... and ... those who guard their private parts. Except from their wives and what their right hands possess" (23:1-6) (as quoted by Kibble, 2016: p.32) in order to justify men's exposure of their private parts to wives but also to women captured during wars. Al-Muhajirah also uses the following Hadith to justify rape of non-ISIS

women: "Approaching any married woman is fornication, except for a woman who has been enslaved" (as cited by Kibble, p.32).

In addition to these two political commentaries, another five journal articles detail the treatment of Yezidi women and consider how this features as part of ISIS doctrine and strategy. Sverdlov (2017) argues that ISIS enslaved at least 6,000 Yezidi women, and notes that contemporary violence towards Yezidis is in the context of centuries of suspicion of them as non-Muslims. He lists the multiple ISIS crimes against Yezidis. On invasion of the Sinjar region, ISIS troops buried 500 Yezidis alive for refusing to convert and abducted 5270 women. Since 2016 another 72 mass graves including 15,000 bodies have been found, tens of thousands have been displaced. ISIS prevented Yezidi women from escape by making all women register themselves on a database. They established a set of institutions to enforce and legitimise enslavement – 'First, the courts used ancient Islamic religious sources to bring back the practice. The main justification put forward came from an Islamic law that allows fighters to enslave people… who could be classified as "Mushrikin" [pagans], in contrast to "People of the Book." ISIL courts ruled that Yazidis are "Mushrikin" because of their alleged polytheistic beliefs, although the Yazidis are monotheistic, that the women could be enslaved' (p.338). Then ISIS courts organised laws on slave transactions and signed off on slave contracts. To regulate the re-sale of Yezidi slaves, they established rules for sex with slaves, prohibiting men from sexual relations with a pregnant woman, the same man having sex with the mother and the child, and the sharing of sex slaves by fathers and sons (p.339).

Nicolaus and Yuse (2017) add the following information on forms of abuse perpetrated against Yezidi women and girls: 'raped on a daily basis, sometimes while their toddlers watched in terror… physically and mentally tortured, only to be resold once their tormentors lost interest. Some of them were even forced to undergo hymen reconstruction before being resold. In addition, they often suffered torture from the jealous wives of their owners' (p.200). Women were forced to undergo abortions, particularly because a *fatwa* (religious edict) prevented the resale of slaves that became pregnant. In terms of legitimisation of this violence, the authors highlight testimonies that indicate men prayed and called Yezidi women to convert to Islam before raping and abusing them and, in doing so, ISIS men made a conscious decision to ignore Suras that encourage peaceful conversion in favour of hadiths that encourage violent repression. A further section of this article explores the way that honour and shame codes within Yezidi families have made it difficult for escaped Yezidi women and girls to re-integrate into their communities and families. Connected to this, Kizhiland and Noll-Husong (2017) discuss their research on the long-term impacts on Yezidi women, noting substantial medical and psychological issues.

Kenny and Malik (2019) consider how human trafficking, particularly gender and sexual based violence, relate to terrorist activity. They identify the use of human trafficking and the sexual enslavement of girls/women by ISIS, Boko Haram, Al-Shabaab, Taliban, Hezbollah, and non-state groups in Nepal, Colombia, Ivory Coast and Sri Lanka. They argue that sexual violence, trafficking and terrorism encompass 'a vicious cycle in which each crime effectively flows from the commission of the others: sexual violence is facilitated by human trafficking, human trafficking is motivated, in part, by sexual violence, and both crimes spread terror among civilian populations' (p.43). They are also concerned with the criminal prosecution of these crimes under the Rome Statute, and the UN declaration on 'the deliberate use of

human trafficking and sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) as a tactic of terrorism' (p.44), which is enabled by technology to sell people online, but point out that this has never been the subject of any prosecution. The authors identify four reasons for ISIS and Boko Haram's involvement in this activity: in order to generate money for their organisations; as part of their ideology; to enable processes of dehumanisation; and as part of their military strategy (p.47). They cite evidence that Boko Haram and ISIS have been invested in abducting women and girls in order to generate revenue for the organisation's military activities. The monetary value of women and girls is protected by forcing them to use birth control and prevent pregnancies so that they can be resold (p.47). For ISIS, the availability of sex slaves has also been a means for drawing in new fighters, particularly from poor and conservative backgrounds who are looking for means to bolster their status. Offering wives and sex slaves is also a means for retaining fighters.

However, Kenny and Malik (2019) argue that these groups are also using ideological arguments to justify their crimes, particularly by projecting the women as 'other' and as 'infidels' – this is evident in ISIS' targeting of Yazidi women rather than Shia or Christian women and Boko Haram's focus on Christian women. In each of these contexts, the women are treated as property, even transferred to other fighters after death. ISIS' ideological justifications for trafficking include 'the freeing of enslaved women from "shirk" (disbelief) and precipitating conversions to Islam; the punishment of kuffar (disbelievers); the need to illustrate the supremacy of IS captors; the requirement to increase the offspring of mujahideen (fighters); and, the use of slaves as a reward for mujahideen' (p.50). Islamist organisations also justify this activity when they see it is being undertaken by other Islamist organisations. Boko Haram are particularly focused on converting women/girls they have abducted. The authors also refer to forced reproduction – where sexual violence is justified on the grounds of enlarging the Caliphate. Moreover, they argue that sexual and gender-based violence is used by these groups to enable the dehumanisation that is required for human trafficking and the fear that is required for terrorism, so these things are related. The threat of sexual violence induces fear and terror and it has also enabled terrorist organisations to 'clear territory', so it is also an operational tactic. The authors argue that while these crimes are often seen in relation to religion, race and ethnicity, gender is missed even though gender is a common feature and these are intersectional crimes.

In all of these accounts there is little information on whether this violence extends to ISIS men's treatment of their wives and, as discussed below, the stories of female recruits to ISIS do not make reference to intimate partner violence. What little there is, portrays ISIS wives as equally invested in violence against Yezidi women, calling for their brutalisation and their murder. There is also only passing reference to the treatment of Yezidi men.

INCELS, 'REJECTION VIOLENCE' AND 'RAPE LISTS'

The Alt-Right literature focuses on men's entitlement to sex and resentment towards women's sexual autonomy. The Incels literature in particular discusses how some of these young men take up instruction on how to pressurise and coerce women into sex, but we have limited knowledge of the extent to which they put this into practice. The Anti-Defamation League (undated) argue that the discourse of the 'pick

up' artist is part of rape culture and make a strong case for increased legal and policy attention to this issue. We do know that a proportion of Incels engage in the targeted sexual harassment of women on social media.

The Incels name stems from a claim that they are 'involuntary celibates', deprived of access to sex, disadvantaged in what they term the sexual marketplace. Dr Nerdlove (2018) views Incels as insular, with their own internal ideologies and forms of language. The misogyny is not just targeted at conventionally stereotypical women but extends to those who do not fit beauty standards and a specific fury at women who sell sex, who are viewed as profiting from the inequality they are contesting. The grouping is formed around hate, which includes a self-loathing which also fuels rage: the focus of rage is less about sex and more a resentment that it is women who get to decide. Tolentino (2018) adds that Incels are not looking for sex but for male supremacy, and contests some of the more simplistic policy responses, such as making sex dolls more available.

The term 'rejection violence' comes from Lily Thacker (2019) who connects some of the lethal violence by white supremacists to punishment for women's refusal of sex. Thacker argues that the Alt-Right are invested in accentuating 'a specific model of manhood, geared toward dominance and control… that views women as inferior, sees sex as an act, not of affection but domination and which valorises violence as a way to prove oneself to the world' (p. 1). Thacker (2019) identifies 40 cases in media reports in the previous six years, with most in the USA and one each in England, India, Malaysia and South Korea, of men's violence against women that are attributed to the women rejecting men sexually. She argues that men internalise shame at the rejection, that their position of dominance has been undermined, which in turn leads to a devaluation of women: they have been deprived of what they feel entitled to.

Sabur (2019) in *the Telegraph* notes that another Incel killer, Connor Betts, had made a 'rape list', and that there were 'red flags' for years.

Chu (2018) explores the possible attractions of Incel ideology to young Asian men, through what he terms 'self-compartmentalisation' especially with respect to sex: that there currently is no space for men to talk about sex without it being either bragging or shameful.

ANTI-FEMINISM

A shared characteristic across all the organisations addressed in the literature review is that they are anti-feminist. They hark back to a golden age of male entitlement and berate the emergence of the new social movements as if these disrupted a natural order of things (see also Blais and Dupuis-Deri, 2011; Fielitz and Thurston, 2019).

Fundamentalists of all hues openly target women's human rights defenders (Bennoune, 2013; Lantos, 2002; Rothschild, 2017; Varma et al., 2015). Women transgressing fundamentalist proscriptions have been subjected to public beatings and lethal violence (Bennoune, 2013; Lantos, 2002). The general literature search on fundamentalism identified two newspaper articles on Islamists targeting women but both pieces are dated and fairly short. Lantos (2002) focuses on the Taliban's assault on Afghan women's

rights in relation to preventing them from seeking employment, confining them to the home, insisting on male escorts where women have to move outside the home, a ban on female education and restricting their access to health care. Women transgressing these rules were subjected to public beatings, symbolised by the image of Taliban men pointing their rifles at a kneeling burka clad woman at the grounds of a sports stadium. Wilding (2005) connects this with practices in Saudi Arabia, which he describes as gender apartheid and reports that a jihadist group in Iraq, Mujahideen Shura Group, issued an edict during Ramadan threatening to kill any women appearing on the streets unveiled and without a male chaperone. There are some chilling resonances with the London Bridge attacks in 2017, also taking place during Ramadan. Moreover, a prominent Iraqi women's organisation (Organisation of Women's Freedom in Iraq) had been subjected to violence as the director of the organisation received death threats and the chair of one of its branches was assaulted. This chimes with Karima Bennoune's (2013) incisive book, *Your Fatwa Does Not Apply Here*, which documents the threats and violence against people of Muslim heritage, artists, feminist activists, that dissent from fundamentalist codes and orders. The reader is made aware of the immense risks that each of them has taken in the face of fundamentalist violence and power in their area but also of the fundamentalist opposition to dissent, freedom of expression, and feminism.

Cynthia Rothschild (2017) argues that fundamentalism is patriarchal and fundamentalist movements are, across the board, involved in promoting misogynistic cultures. She notes that religious fundamentalist movements are currently at the centre of an assault on a whole range of rights including the right to bodily autonomy, land, environment, food, sexual and reproductive rights, freedom of expression, and freedom of association. She illustrates the particular assault on women's rights by drawing on examples of religious fundamentalist campaigns across a range of religions and countries including: the withholding of contraception; the denial of sex education; the criminalisation of abortion; preventing women from choosing their own partners; attacks on inter-faith and inter-caste marriage and relations; denial of and discrimination in inheritance; criminalisation of gay men and lesbian women; and attacks on NGOs that defend women's rights. This is why, she argues, challenges to fundamentalism can connect and support struggles across multiple spaces. Yet more cross-country and cross-religion examples of fundamentalist assaults on feminists and women's rights are provided by Varma et al. (2015).

The Alt-Right are also explicit about their opposition to feminism. Marwick and Caplan (2018) note that the internet affords activists a space in which they can orchestrate networked harassment of women through depictions of feminism as a man-hating movement. Jaki et al (2019), using big data methodologies, outline how in and out groups are created and claim that their machine deep learning system was able to detect what they term misogynist hate speech with 95% accuracy.

Zhane Hunte (2019) analysed Reddit threads of the group Men Going Their Own Way (MGTOW), part of the manosphere which she defines as 'online communities that view feminism as a threat, and that uphold misogynist ideas' (p.8). She argues this is linked to online and real life harassment and violence. The masculinity which is performed and created through these threads is constructed through mastery, rationality, courage and violence (p.25). The various communities are linked through the notion of a crisis in masculinity and 'undertones of white supremacy and misogyny' (p.7) often articulated through

particular readings of evolutionary psychology. Participants are mainly white men who eulogise traditional femininity and express Kimmel's 'aggrieved entitlement' (p.22). Victimhood is evoked through the idea that men are victims of feminist hegemony, with entire threads dedicated to challenging feminist work and research on violence against women. The particular take of MGTOW is that hegemonic masculinity requires a sexual partner, which this group rejects in the form of radical but resentful celibacy. Hunte notes that while they claim to be focusing on men, much of their discourse is in fact about women.

Mary Lilly's (2016) *The World is not a Safe Place for Men*, is an early analysis of the manosphere, which is disparaging of women and femininity. Masculinity is depicted as under siege and feminism is presented as hypocritical and oppressive.

> The manosphere is an informal cyberspace network of blogs, websites, and forums that concentrate on issues concerning men and masculinity — issues as diverse as men's rights, the male sex role, sex and relationships with women, the economy and feminism. Commonly held amongst its frequenters is the feeling that the culture in the West is one of misandry—hatred of men and masculinity—that men are oppressed, and that women dominate and are more privileged than men [Lilly, 2016: 1].

The Incels literature is key here, as Incels men share the following characteristics: empathy with others who have committed violent misogyny; overt anger or resentment toward women; and pre-operational hostile surveillance of places frequented or populated primarily by women (Crimando, 2019). They share with fundamentalists the propensity towards lethal violence against women but also against general publics as revenge against rejection by specific women. A number of massacres have taken place in the name of Incels (Crimando, 2019): in 2014, Elliot Rodger killed 7 and injured 14 in Isla Vista, California; in 2018, Alek Minassian killed 10 and injured 16 in Toronto. The Anti-Defamation League (undated) add Chris Harper Mercer to this list. Brenzinger (2019) adds two other Canadian cases, Nikolas Cruz, a high school killer and Scott Beierle, who in 2018 killed two young women in a yoga studio and injured more. Beierle had some years previously been arrested for sexual harassment and banned from the campus. As a consequence, Canada has invested $2 million into researching this group, and they are considered a threat by some US universities. It's important to see that this terrorising violence and targeted harassment is intended to mute women's resistance and act as a break on voicing support for feminism/expanding women's rights.

Anti-feminism and misogyny is deeply intertwined with aggressive masculinity, discussed in the next section. The Anti-Defamation League (ADL, undated) maintain that there is a cross pollination between white supremacy and misogyny, for example the term 'thots' used by Alt-Right groups to describe women: it means 'that ho over there' (p.6). They also cite Andrew Anglin, the founder of *the Daily Stormer* who describes himself as 'the tip of a spear against the feminist menace' and makes the highly contentious claim that women crave abuse.

A new global masculinism is identified by Nicolas and Agius (2018) which includes an implicit universalism, naturalises dominance and social inequality: this is achieved in part through a male supremacist opposition to feminism that connects the interpersonal and the international. Purtill (2018) adds that

within such ideologies, masculinity is considered central to the nation. From an Australian perspective, Duriesmith et al (2018) argue that misogyny needs to become a matter of public concern and policy, noting that both the mass killers in Australia had histories of gender-based violence. They further maintain that these men are hard to identify since they spend much of their political lives online. That said, they note the emergence of Lads Societies, clubs for white nationalist anti-feminist men who meet to do martial arts and weight training. They make a strong argument that such groups should be considered a security threat. This reflection on gyms as male spaces of mobilisation for supremacist organisations also corresponds with recent information on Islamist organising in the UK: the London Bridge attackers and key Islamists activists in South Manchester all organised through gyms and boxing clubs.

Mike Wendling (2019) agrees that there is a 'robust symbiosis between misogyny and white supremacy' (p. 1), noting that this is a dangerous, but frequently under-recognised component of extremism. The clearest example is the Incel group, who organise around a male grievance at not getting the sex they think they deserve. One component here are the 'pick up artists' whose livelihoods are founded on the claim that they can enable men to overcome women's resistance. For example, Roosh V has argued that there is a war against heterosexual men:

> Make no mistake that this is a war against heterosexual men. This is the war of our generation. This is a war against men who are presumed guilty at birth, and whose innocence is mere purgatory until a newly devised outrage sends them to hell. You are the enemy and you will be denounced in the form of "misogynist," "creep," and "sexist," and this denouncement will stay with you and affect your livelihood in ways that modern technology allow. You will be prosecuted by the fattest and ugliest cunts of the land, with no hope of appeal (cited in Anti-Defamation League, undated, p. 14).

Roosh V has written ten sex tourism guides, with titles such as *Bang Iceland, Bang Ukraine.* Wendling concludes that more attention needs to be paid to this issue in counter-extremism through: increased awareness of misogynist hate in law enforcement; an enhanced policy focus on women's equality, including within all work on anti-extremism; an ongoing dialogue between tech companies and civil society to counter misogyny online, noting that currently sex is not a protected characteristic on Twitter.

PATRIARCHAL GENDER ORDERS AND FEMALE RECRUITS

Within the fundamentalism literature, particularly on Hindutva and ISIS, there is some suggestion that the recruitment of women into these organisations is evidence that they are not as patriarchal and misogynistic as they would appear (see, for example, Lia, 2017 and OSCE, 2019). On Hindutva, Varma (2017) notes that while patriarchal norms are writ large for the Hindu right project, women have increasingly been invited in as cadre and some female members have been prosecuted for their complicity in heinous acts of violence in Gujarat in 2002. However, her own article demonstrates that the inclusion of women in the Hindutva project is not a breach of gender orders because it is located within a wider opposition to feminism and secularism as it promotes service, duty, obligation and sacrifice over rights and autonomy.

The OSCE (2019) report indicates that in 2014/15, at its height, ISIS recruited 40,000 foreign fighters of which 6,000 were from Western Europe. A later report indicated that 13% of foreign fighters were women, that their roles are more varied than previously assumed and they are less likely to return to their countries of origin (p.26). They suggest that it is more difficult for women to leave ISIS.

Brynjar Lia (2017) contends that female recruitment in itself contests the portrayal of ISIS as 'ultra-masculinist', misogynistic and patriarchal, and takes issue with feminist analyses which depict Islamists, particularly jihadists, as violently patriarchal, pre-occupied with masculinity and virility and forms of militarised masculinity. Lia argues that ISIS focuses on religious conviction rather than blood ties (contrary to the patriarchal interest in kinship), and they are largely run by young men that are challenging established lines of power, particularly tribal networks, clans and elderly men. He proposes that jihadists represent 'a revolt against an existing order in which young men and women are expected to obey, revere, and remain subservient to elder men, often their own kin' (p.462). Women, Lia claims, are 'active participants' whose roles vary even if these are prescribed by the ideologues and mainly located within the household 'as housewives and mothers'. He points to ISIS' female section – the al-Khansa Brigade - and their 'preoccupation with defining women's role in written rules and regulations' (p.464). He also argues that ISIS can be considered more progressive than Al Qaida and Boko Haram, since women are present in the public sphere such as hospitals, education and the military and represented as vociferous fighters in ISIS videos. Despite Lia's attempts to demonstrate that this is not patriarchy as we know it, there is no escaping his own evidence that the ideological commitment is to women's role in the private sphere, the restrictions on movements for all women except the wives of elite ISIS fighters, and the serious punishments meted out to women that transgress these laws.

Saltman and Smith (2016) offer a different perspective, considering push and pull factors in the recruitment of women and a detailed analysis of 7 English speaking women who joined ISIS, using a joint database tracking over a 100 female profiles on social media platforms. They find 'a significant amount of diversity within the profiles of women being radicalised' (p.7) and argue that it's difficult to 'profile' women at risk of radicalisation and reasons for joining ISIS cannot be reduced to the 'jihadi brides' framing. While they note some evidence of women recruited as doctors and educators, the primary emphasis is still on women as wives to ISIS fighters, reproducing the ISIS nation through childbearing (and this is why the researchers refer to them as 'migrants' rather than as 'fighters'). The authors identify three push factors: social or cultural isolation and questions of belonging including experiences of discrimination among hijab or nikab wearing women; the 'feeling that the international Muslim community as a whole is being violently persecuted' over a long period of time; and 'anger or sadness at a perceived lack of international action in response to this persecution' (p. 11). Their detailed analysis of seven cases is particularly revealing – sisterhood of the *ummah* or community of Muslim believers is juxtaposed against the dehumanised nations of non-believers, or *kuffar*. There is still limited information on the lives of women recruits but what there is indicates that it is mired by early forced marriage, polygamy, short-lived marriages and widowhood, pressure to remarry and seclusion following the death of a husband. Saltman and Smith (2016) refer to women receiving self-defence training with weapons but there is little suggestion that they actually engage in combat. This can be understood through Laura Sjoberg's (2017) concept of 'gender disorders' – a temporary situation that is not indicative of the overall objective or

ideology. In any case, it is not uncommon for women to be involved in reproducing patriarchal orders, women's presence in and complicity with those regimes does not make those regimes any less patriarchal. Moreover, Jacoby (2015) argues that 'ISIS women are merely exchanging one patriarchy for another, probably a more restrictive one. Participation in ISIS may increase the status of particular women in the eyes of the movement, but status does not translate to equality or freedom, themselves primary feminist values' (p.542). Peresin and Cervone (2015) add that women's role in combat is restricted to 'extreme situations of enemy attack' (p.8) and the primary purpose of the Al Khansaa Brigade is to enforce Shariah Law, which they have done through brutal punitive methods such as disfigurement and torture.

Unfortunately, information on the personal or family histories of female recruits is very limited but what there is indicates they join ISIS at a very young age, they come from conservative religious backgrounds (including from families where male relatives are linked to terrorist organisations), and they express hatred towards the west. Pearson and Winterbotham's (2017) research notes the gender dimensions of community perception, mechanisms of recruitment, and reasons for joining. Their findings are from focus groups and interviews with local communities in two cities across five countries – UK, Canada, France, Germany and the Netherlands. While male recruits are seen as motivated by political ideology, religious conviction and a desire for status, female recruits are viewed as naïve and vulnerable and as having been duped or as looking for romantic involvement. From their nine interviews with radicalised young people and five interviews and focus group input from the family members of radicalised young people, the authors suggest that the actual situation is a lot more complex. These insights into radicalisation, they argue, show that some of the recruitment strategies are indeed gendered as recruiters look to exploit the particular spaces that men and women occupy but also show many similarities in terms of young people feeling discriminated against (though for women this is as much about discrimination in the private sphere as in the public sphere), connections with a radicalised milieu, growing religious conviction, and a commitment to violence. In wanting to challenge assumptions however, it feels as if Winterbotham and Pearson downplay their interviews with experts which point to the impact of patriarchal households and young women's lack of resilience, particularly arising from their confinement to the private sphere.

Pearson's (2018) subsequent focus on online recruitment adds to understanding gendered patterns in recruitment – restrictions on women's movements means they are more often recruited through online communities of belonging while men are more likely to be recruited in face to face contact on the street. Pearson's analysis of tweets also finds distinct online gender performances with women focused on policing modesty on the one hand and men focused on going into battle on the other.

In summary, several articles on ISIS identify key gender differences in the recruitment of men and women, particularly that they may be drawn into the organisation by social or cultural isolation, the offer of belonging and sisterhood, religious conviction and romanticisation of the experience. Just one author suggests that recruitment is connected to abuse at home but provides little evidence to support this claim.

A further three journal articles focused on women's recruitment into Al Qaeda (AQ). Aasgaard (2017) explores the magazines *Inspire*, *Risalah* and *Dabiq* – to compare the way that ISIS and AQ position women. She does find some examples of the celebration of female recruits, such as AQ's section on Roshonara

Chaudhry, the teenager from East Ham in Newham who stabbed Stephen Timms MP and Boko Haram's use of female suicide bombers. AQ's recruitment of western European women is not a new phenomenon but the AQ discussion of *hijrah* (migration) is focused on male fighters, there is almost no discussion of women. AQ does have a female magazine named after the widow of a jihadi fighter - *al-Shamikha* – but the only reference to women suggests that women and children should not travel until their husband says it is safe to join him and generally discourages women from joining:

> (T)here are strong indications that the Nusrah front [AQ in Iraq] does not want women to join the group in Syria. There is no structure to host women or children, and women do not have a function in the insurgency war the Nusrah front is conducting. Marriages will make the men attached to an area. This will make the war the Nusrah front is conducting against Assad's regime more difficult (p. 103).

Aasgard finds that AQ women are definitely in the background and they are subservient. The role of AQ women is to cook, to reproduce, to encourage their husbands to fight and to raise children so that they will, in the future, be willing to undertake jihad.

Though there is re-iteration of the restrictions on AQ women and their experience of gender inequality is certainly consistent with the discussion of ISIS women above, there is no information on whether violence in the public sphere extends into the private sphere, though there is evidence of the control of women in intimate relationships.

MASCULINITY CONSTRUCTS

The Religious Right and the Alt-Right are also united by a backward-looking masculinity that seeks to (re)assert dominance over women. Masculinity is an explicit theme in the literature on the Alt-Right. While also discussed in relation to religious supremacist organisations, masculinity is under-theorised in that literature, and it is rarely addressed in relation to the UK Far Right. A number of different terms are being used by authors and commentators: aggressive masculinity; aggrieved masculinity; beta masculinity; outraged masculinity; militarised masculinity; hypermasculinity; toxic masculinity; righteous masculinity; hybrid masculinities; ideological masculinity; nerd masculinity; and violent masculinity. The connection across the groups is the issue of grievance, which is marshalled to invite men (and some women) into an ideological project, which at its extreme justifies violence. That said, these constructions of masculinity are not the same, and further exploration of their relevance to CT work is needed. The political groups in focus tend to be controlled by men and have underpinning masculinist ideologies. In too much of the literature this is taken for granted, rather than seen as a vital issue for analysis and intervention. This section explores literature which takes a masculinity invested in both male and white supremacy as a foundational thread through which contemporary Far Right thinking has developed.

Michael Kimmel's (2013) *Angry White Men* is the first book length exploration of the ways US masculinities have responded to political-economic changes in industrialised societies. His concept of 'aggrieved entitlement' (p.x) summarises this: many white men talk of a gendered humiliation, no longer having a secure sense of themselves as men, and positioning themselves as victims. He refers to the Internet as a

'man cave' noting the emergence of concerted efforts by men's rights activists to challenge feminist work on VAW through a series of 'misplaced reversals' (p. 123): arguing that rape is about sex rather than violence; insisting there is a gender symmetry in IPV; and campaigning for access to women's services rather than working to increase those for men. They bemoan the emasculation of white men, while criticizing the masculinity of 'others' (p.257). He concludes 'men's rights are almost entirely a movement of angry straight white men' (p. 125). While recognising that there are legitimate grievances with respect to the loss of employment, he notes that one must feel entitled to violence to use it (p. 178). In an insightful passage he comments 'the nexus among honour, masculinity and violence is deep and profound in many cultures' (p. 178), contending that the use of violence can be experienced as restorative of masculinity. The appeal of the right wing to these men is that it offers to empower men who feel they have lost their power, restoration of a masculinity which requires constant validation that they should be at the top of a hierarchy. Kimmel is the first to note that mass killers who are white are often mislabelled as having mental illness rather than that they have been radicalised (p.43) and that governments have failed to address white supremacists (p.57).

Debbie Ging (2017) explores the Internet, and social media in particular, in a different way, that articulations of Kimmel's aggrieved masculinity (p.638) are created in these spaces: she argues that the trope of victimhood, 'beta masculinity' and involuntary celibacy are new hybrid masculinities.

Grant and MacDonald (2018) echo the claim that masculinism is at the heart of Alt-Right ideology, using the contested concept of toxic masculinity, which they argue is 'primarily characterised by dominance, aggression, strength, sexual conquest and the rejection of any traits or behaviours associated with femininity' (p. 1). They suggest that it is the disappearance of the patriarchal dividend which sits at the heart of contemporary right wing extremism: that men can no longer rely on a taken for granted legitimacy of white male dominance. This is less about being 'left behind' and more of a status threat, which fuels a sense of aggrieved entitlement. It is the attempt to restore dominance, which sits at the heart of the culture wars, with some Alt-Right activists appropriating the term 'counter-culture' to underpin their ideological work. Analysis of this discourse reveals a tension between an outward presentation of strength and dominance and an inner core of uncertainty, doubt and resentment (p.9). Violence features strongly, invoking the traditional notion of it as the maker of a man. They argue for more attention to these issues in education, as do Miller-Idress and Pilkington (2017). In the latter case, however, there is recognition that schools, rather than being spaces for the exploration of identities and building trust, remain places where dominant masculinities are reproduced. The challenges are, therefore, formidable.

Lily Thacker (2019) in *The Danger of No* argues that toxic masculinity is invested in accentuating a binary opposition between masculinity and femininity and cites a definition from Hauder (2016): 'a specific model of manhood, geared toward dominance and control… that views women as inferior, sees sex as an act, not of affection but domination and which valorises violence as a way to prove oneself to the world' (p. 1).

Beauchamp (2018) locates a shift to the idea of an Incel rebellion to a Facebook post made by Alek Minassian before he killed 10 people in Toronto, also using the idea of a 'beta uprising'. Here the power of ideas to radicalise frustrated young men on the basis of personal grievances is highlighted. Some of the irreverent language is cited here, successful 'alpha males are referred to as 'Chads', a masculine ideal which Incels cannot gain due to poor genetics. The women they have relationships with are Traceys. The resentment of women's sexual agency is connected to the sexual revolution. There are strong echoes of R.W. Connell's (2010) work on masculinities but here it is used to position themselves as an oppressed rather than oppressor class.

Joshua Roose (2019) argues that new Far Right formations should be understood as forms of 'ideological masculinity', seeking to reclaim what they see as rightfully theirs, which at its worst is violent: the Incel Rebellion, for example, advocate terrorism against women.

Treadwell & Garland (2011) are unusual in offering an analysis of the EDL, which emphasises the cultivation of a specific masculinity, rooted in marginalisation and violence. They offer three case studies as exemplars of how the EDL construct a specific violent masculinity by turning structural inequalities into internal scripts, which can then be moulded into resentment and anger, creating micro-climates of insecurity, aggression and domination. They, like Kimmel (2013), note the importance of shame, which can be converted into anger and rage. That so much of the activity is done in groups; an audience is part of a masculine performance. They note the irony that it is the use of violence which serves to lock these young men into the margins.

Angela Nagle (2017) documents the misogyny on the networking sites of 4chan and 8chan, preferred locations for Alt-Right organising, through which a specific Alt-Right masculinity is created and performed producing a nerdish 'beta' male identity (p. 14) within an 'anti-feminist online culture' (p. 18), and a 'rampant, hateful misogyny' (p.87). The 'beta' construct is an intentional contrast to the widely recognised concept of 'alpha' male (or hegemonic masculinity requiring a sexual partner), which these men regard as unattainable for them. For Nagel, beta masculinity is a 'mixture of performative vulnerability, self-righteous wokeness and bullying' (p.76), which can simultaneously encompass victimhood and callousness.

Mary Lily (2016) locates the changes within political, economic and social power relations: that this group of men organise to maintain status quo through notions of lost birth right and heritage, a mythologising of the past. Violence is considered restorative of masculinity. In her analysis of pick up artists (PUAs) she shows how they present 'date rape' as a skill that can be taught: a white supremacist is cited as saying 'at some point in every woman's soul, they want to be taken by a strong man'. She is one of few commentators to explicitly address the appropriation of language and reversals of meaning from both feminist and anti-racist discourse. An example here would be the representation of sex as a human right for men, which in turn leads to rage at women as sexual gatekeepers. Others include framing migrants as colonisers, and the concept of white genocide.

Lewis et al (2017) are among an increasing number of researchers (see also Roose, 2019, Graff et al, 2019) who make connections between the Far Right and Islamists, in this case in Australia, through 'heroic and

salvational masculine violence' (p.8). This is a core theme in Julia Ebner's (2017) *The Rage*, in which she argues that there is 'reciprocal radicalisation' (p.xziii), connected through narratives of grievance, which make references to the past, present and future.

Salter (2017) emphasises what he terms a geek masculinity, which is a claim to an identity with internal logics that includes an instrumental attitude to women and exploitative relationships. His focus is the gendering of technological spaces and the ways in which this enables the reproduction of hierarchal social relations: resistance to change is the protection of a masculine space. Ging (2017) argues that the role of technology and social media in right wing mobilisation is creating new 'hybrid masculinities', which need to be attended to and understood.

In a special issue of the feminist journal *SIGNS* (Graff et al, 2019) a number of contributors point to the global increase in populism which includes an assertion of masculinity and is deemed central to the nation. Joshua Roose (2019), who has a forthcoming book *New Demagogues: Populism, Religion and Masculinity*, argues that new Far Right formations should be understood as forms of 'ideological masculinity', reclaiming what they see as rightfully theirs, which at its worst is violent. He makes a strong case that such groups fit the Australian definition of 'violent extremism'. He also makes parallels between groups like the US Proud Boys which call out the misogyny and homophobia of Islamists, while having similar views.

There is also considerable reference to masculinity in the literature on religious supremacists but it is under-theorised. In the literature on Hindu fundamentalism, both Bina Srinivasan (2004) and Himani Bannerji (2006) argue that an 'aggressive masculinity' lies at the heart of the Hindutva project. Bannerji also notes that this is interchangeably invoked alongside a benevolent masculinity, both reflected in the different faces of Ram. Varma (2017) refers to Hindutva as the 'masculinist state', but she does not distinguish between 'good' and 'bad' masculinity. In terms of Islamism, Agathangelou and Ling (2004) use the term 'hypermasculinity' in their comparison of the US military and Al Qaeda. The authors draw on Ashish Nandy's work to argue that both US and AQ are engaged in 'a reactive stance [which] arises when agents of hegemonic masculinity feel threatened or undermined, thereby needing to inflate, exaggerate, or otherwise distort their traditional masculinity' (p.519).

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

The thematic analysis of the overlaps and connections between radicalisation and VAWG presented in this literature review have a range of implications for policy and practice. All the political formations discussed here, are pre-occupied with maintaining a fictional racial or religious purity of the group and draw on nostalgic invocations of a past in which male superiority and positions of power in families, relationships and communities were taken for granted. It is the desire to restore such positions which provide one of the legitimations for public and private violence.

While the data is not yet robust across both religious and racial supremacist organisations, there are clear overlaps with a range of forms of VAWG in both childhood and adulthood. This data needs to be collected and collated more routinely for two reasons: it may offer insights into the roots of a sense of victimhood in those who have been radicalised; and it will highlight where there are women and children in need of protection. More robust datasets will enable further exploration of how violence traverses the public/private.

We have presented significant evidence of the involvement of racial/religious supremacists in perpetrating a range of forms of violence against women and girls and the way they have targeted women's human rights defenders and women's rights. We currently know that a range of forms of VAWG are connected to violent extremism - domestic abuse, sexual violence including trafficking, sexual exploitation and sexual harassment, forced and child marriage. This needs to be recognised within counter-terrorism work, including through policy and training. Sexual exploitation also appears to unite some religious and racial supremacists but further research is required on this area.

As we write, the Black Lives Matters protests are uncovering limited awareness of the history of slavery and colonialism. A similar argument could be made about the struggles for women's rights and sexual autonomy. History and citizenships curricula at all levels of education need to address these histories and provide spaces for discussion and debate. This includes the gendered dimensions of the political ideologies addressed in this literature review. The new Relationships and Sex Education curriculum is an important space for raising awareness of how these organisations and ideologies impact unhealthy relationships, sexual pressure, coercion and violence against women and girls.

We concur with the authors who argue that a gendered lens needs to become part of understanding and addressing terrorism and radicalisation. The ways in which gender is understood offer possibilities and pitfalls for policy and practice: some of the material reviewed locates women as potential preventers of radicalisation, especially mothers. Such positions rarely recognise the limited power of mothers and often underplay the ways women and girls are harmed by supremacist ideas. Such simplistic positions run the danger of reproducing the patriarchal ideas they seek to challenge.

A range of constructs of masculinity were identified in the literature, all of which seek to make visible the fact that these movements are predominantly made up of men and that forms of violence are offered as a way of achieving manhood. Many of these constructs are in fact underscored by a dominant uniform way of being a man and lead us back to this dominant paradigm. Nonetheless, more attention needs to

be given to masculinity constructs in approaches to radicalisation, with room to clarify the constructs themselves and which of these relate to different forms of violent extremism.

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