The Taliban, Public Space, and Terror in Pakistan

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Abstract: Two UK-based specialists on terrorism in Pakistan use empirical evidence to document and analyze the Pakistani Taliban's (Tehrik-e-Taliban) practice of targeting spaces of public interaction for terrorism intended to suppress expressions of public unity and restrict venues for open discussion. In tracing the rise of the Taliban in Pakistan, the authors review the country's history of state and civil society formation , its relations with Afghanistan, and U.S. and Western policy in the region. The authors present timely information and insights that enhance understanding of the recent surge in terrorist attacks on civilians in Pakistan and its ties to the eastward spread of conflict from neighboring Afghanistan. *Journal of Economic Literature*, Classification Numbers: F520, F540, O180, Z000. 3 figures, 1 table, 83 references. Key words: Pakistan, Afghanistan, Tehrik-e-Taliban, terrorism, suicide bombers, public spaces, al-Qaeda, Khyber-Pakhtunkwa province, Swat valley, Wahhabis.

As documented by a team of geographers headed by John O'Loughlin, the military conflict in Afghanistan involving U.S.-led coalition forces and the Taliban has, by virtue of driving the insurgents eastward to sanctuaries in Pakistan's Tribal Areas, brought that violence to that country's soil. And although conflict in Pakistan has replicated all three forms documented by O'Loughlin et al. (2010a) in Afghanistan (i.e., events involving foreign forces, local forces, and insurgents),[2] the most numerous, by far, in the country's urban areas and all regions beyond 100 km of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border (ibid., their Figs. 9D and 11D) are events involving insurgents. While the targets of such groups include both local (e.g., police, provincial militia) and foreign forces, it is the targeting of civilians and the recent increase in that activity[3] that is the focus of this paper. We take into account that such terrorist acts can be ideologically motivated and represent one form of resistance to the penetration of Western popular culture into the broader region as seen by Gritzner (2010) in this journal, but see and look at them differently.

In this paper, we posit that terrorism by insurgent groups in Pakistan, and specifically the Pakistani Taliban (Terhik-e-Taliban Pakistan, henceforth TTP), incorporates a deliberate strategy of place destruction, strategically focusing on the location and spaces of their violence, a targeting that is neither irrational nor random. Rather, the objective is to control public spaces by restricting access to these places as well as the activities that are permitted to

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[2]"Insurgents" is a residual category that excludes events involving foreign or Afghanistan/Pakistan military forces and police (O'Loughlin et al., 2010a, pp. 447), and therefore consists predominantly of attacks on civilians by non-military and non-police groups.

[3]As noted in O'Loughlin et al. (2010a, p. 444), 2009 was the deadliest year for suicide attacks in Pakistan's history.

be carried out within them. Similar to the approach employed in O'Loughlin et al. (2010), we seek to support this hypothesis with an empirical analysis drawing upon publicly accessible data that permit the mapping of spatial and temporal patterns of terrorist events in Pakistan during 2008 and 2009. In this respect, our approach diverges from much of the recent research on terrorism by human geographers—a critique of the "Global War on Terror" (GWOT) that has largely failed to analyze terrorism, terrorist acts, or the terrorist in geographical terms (Flint and Radil, 2009; Mustafa, 2009). Before proceeding further, however, it is necessary to refine our understanding of terrorism and how the act is inseparable from the places in which it occurs.

PLACE DESTRUCTION AND TARGETING IN TERRORISM

There is no consensus in policy or academic circles on a definition of terrorism. Schmid and Yongman (2005) summarized that in 109 definitions they found of the term, disagreements were evident about terrorism's symbolic and communicative functions, its targeting, the perpetrators, and about the inevitability and desirability of normative judgments. For example, within the policy realm, the definitions proposed by the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation, the U.S. Department of State, and some religious and political authorities carry the obvious imprint of contemporary and historical power relations (Mustafa, 2005b). Academic attempts at reaching a consensus on a definition, such as Hoffman (2006) and the United Nations (1994), suffer from conceptual over-reach or are overly dependent on experiences of terrorism in the preceding 20th century. In order to move beyond these limitations, this paper follows the senior author's definition, which engages with the human geography of terrorism. Terrorism is understood here to be:

> An act of violence, different from other acts of violence, e.g., genocide, war, war crimes, political assassinations, etc.,[4] in that it is (1) a spectacle directed towards a wider audience than the immediate victims, (2) directed towards place destruction, and/or (3) place alienation. (Mustafa, 2005b, p. 79)

Mustafa's definition draws upon Hewitt's (1987, 1997) work on place destruction and its traumatic effects caused by the firebombing of German cities during World War II, as well as Hewitt's (2001) work on the creation of "geographies of fear" and place alienation by the Pinochet regime in Chile. Accordingly, the deciding factor in terrorism is not the identity of the perpetrator—both state and non-state actors can carry out such acts. Rather, the focus is on place and the spectacle: you are the victim of terrorism if you are subjected to violence not because of who you are or what you have done, but by virtue of *where* you are.

Terrorism has both direct and indirect victims, whose experiences of violence are mediated by places targeted by terrorists. Those initially injured or killed are thus of lesser importance. Rather, the indirect victims, as audiences to that spectacular violence, are the primary concern, as illustrated by Hewitt (2001) in the case of Chile, where people came to associate vast swathes of the country's territory with penal colonies and torture chambers and where disappeared people underwent violence and murder at the hands of the regime. The psychological

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[4]Although types of violence other than terrorism may have a spectacular aspect to them, the prime motivation is to kill a target (with possible publicity being only a secondary objective). The person or group is killed not because of the message it sends, but because of the attributes of the person or group, and what they were doing or had done.

impact of terrorism on the audience occurs via their immediate experience of the target's location/place, or through their identification with analogous cultural landscapes.[5]

Different terrorist actors have different geographical priorities in terms of targets. For example, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and Palestinian suicide bombers target the everyday secular spaces of pubs, dance halls, shopping malls, bus stops, and cafes. In these cases, the terrorist targeting closely mimics some patterns of social exclusion in the everyday lives of the Irish and Palestinians (Mitchell, 1979; Kliot and Charney, 2006). However, Al-Qaeda and those inspired by it have different geographical concerns and ambitions, which leads to different targeting priorities. Al-Qaeda's geographical concerns rely on ideas about sacred spaces, in particular the holy places of Mecca, Medina, and Jerusalem (Hobbs, 2005). Initially its targeting strategy focused on perceived icons of Western modernity. The targeting of the World Trade Center in New York, the Pentagon, U.S. naval vessels, embassies, and rail and air transportation networks demonstrate an excellent understanding of the symbolic, cultural, and practical value of these spaces (Mitchell, 2003). However, since the GWOT has brought the "fight" to the non-Western territories of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iraq, geographical targeting by Al-Qaeda and others inspired by it has also included these non-Western societies' public spaces: Muslim religious shrines, mosques, Eid prayer congregations, market places, girls' schools, political rallies, and the security apparatus. As a result, the overwhelming majority of victims are Muslim noncombatants (Wright, 2008).

This shift is not, however, merely reactive to a more overt Western presence, but also reflects changes in the "moral geography" of the TTP and Al-Qaeda. Wiktorowicz (2005) has argued that the previous divisions between the "near" and "far" enemy are eroding, and Mandaville (2008) notes that the previously upheld dichotomy in the Islamic militants' minds of the "zones of peace" (*dar al-Islam*) and "zones of war" (*dar al-Harb*) is increasingly porous. Recognizing these shifts in moral geography and in the global physical location of terrorism, it is clear that the selection of targets by terrorist groups prioritizes the public spaces of their target audiences: in the West, these are secular iconic spaces of urban living, but in Pakistan, secular as well as religious spaces of rural and urban living.

Our argument is not simply that the geographic logic of contemporary terrorism is defined by its method and targeting practices, but also that its objective is geographically determined. In this we offer a departure with the "new terrorism" thesis that asserts that terrorism is no longer about territory. Recently, Jacqui Smith, then British Home Secretary (2008), remarked that we are confronted by a "new form of terrorism—so different in motivation, complexity and reach, in fact, that it might as well have a different name." The "new terrorism" thesis, reviewed by Field (2009) and Brown (2010), argues that terrorism is fundamentally different from "traditional terrorism" in terms of scale, scope, and aims. In the "new terrorism" thesis, place and space are absent, with spectacular violence communicating a de-territorialized amorphous global jihad (see, *inter alia*, Laqueur, 1996; Simon and Benjamin, 2001; Hoffman, 2006). In contrast, our analysis demonstrates that geography is central, because it is the control of the public sphere, and the destruction of "civilian life" as well as lives, through the spectacle of violence, that characterizes terrorism.

Low and Smith (2006, p. 4) remind us that while the notion of the "public" has different meanings in different societies, it is nevertheless "impossible to conceive of a public space without the social generalization of private space." Particular expressions and performances

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[5]For example, the destruction of tall buildings and crashing airplanes may have greater resonance with audiences in urbanized industrialized societies, whereas suicide bombings of tribal meetings (as in Pakistan) have more importance for rural agrarian audiences.

of worldliness and civilian life are legitimized through the public-private divide. This divide is therefore normatively powerful but empirically complex, and requires constant reinforcement in light of societal changes.

In agreement with Flint and Radil (2009, p. 166), we will demonstrate that while the terrorist network transcends state borders, it is "grounded on the specificities of places." Public sphere is not only a descriptor of "civilian life," but includes the places in which this life takes place—they are "life spaces." The complex and diverse activities that occur in these "life spaces" are multiple performed social interactions and exchanges of "sheer human togetherness"; they are more than formal politics or culture, and have been defined as "civilian life." For Hannah Arendt (1973), as "civilian life" is carried out, individuals develop perspectives, identities, and connections to others and to their environment. She also emphasizes that these are constantly changing and diverse as new people enter into "civilian life." To summarize these two elements (plurality and togetherness), she developed the term "worldliness." The terms "life spaces," "civilian life," and "worldliness" have surfaced to capture the fact that human life is not only about biology, but includes complex social interactions, to the extent that becoming fully human requires such activities. Arendt argues that violence necessarily recasts this divide, and in the case of totalitarianism through the elimination of the divide violence reaches the point at which civilian life is destroyed.

For Arendt, being seen and heard by others, and vice-versa, is the foundation of performative politics, of worldliness. Spectacular violence therefore works to impose a new conception of the public space and moral order that legitimizes some practices, places, and persons, but not others. The implications of our argument are that counter-terrorism measures are incomplete if they do not address the importance of place in terrorism. Therefore, we suggest that responses to terrorism should not only be preoccupied with grand considerations of economics, war, or religion, but should reflect upon the geography of everyday politics (human interaction) carried out in the public sphere. Ultimately, counter-terrorism should seek to defend ordinary human "worldliness" because, as we will demonstrate, the antithesis of terrorism is politics as performance. These two arguments are grounded in Arendt's ideas about politics and the human condition.

GEOGRAPHIES OF TERROR AND CONTROL IN PAKISTAN

Pakistan has been one of the key staging grounds of the Al-Qaeda and Taliban movements' violent campaign against foreign military intervention in neighboring Afghanistan, as well as perceived Western "un-Islamic" influences on the Pakistani society and government. The Taliban in Afghanistan and their allies in Pakistan, who had been protégés of the Pakistani state, were increasingly alienated in the post-2001 geopolitical environment, so that by 2005 they increasingly sought regime change (Rashid, 2001; Abbas, 2005). The result was and continues to be a series of bombings across urban and rural Pakistan, targeting state infrastructure, civilians, and the *de facto* (if seemingly temporary) control over parts of Pakistani territory by the terrorist movement in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the settled districts of Swat, Malakand, and to a lesser extent Dir. In this section, we briefly outline the geographies of terrorist violence in Pakistan in the aftermath of the George W. Bush administration's declared "war on terror." But before discussing the geographies of post-9/11 violence in Pakistan, we should briefly review the socio-geographical context for events in that country.

Fig. 1. Distribution of major ethnic groups in Pakistan.

Socio-Geographical Context of State Formation and Civil Society in Pakistan

Pakistan, like most post-colonial states, incorporates multiple ethnicities within its artificial boundaries (Fig. 1). Consequently it harbors multiple conceptions of its statehood, citizenship, governance, and identity. Conventional explanations of Pakistan's genesis ascribe a central role to religion as a driver of Indian Muslims' nationalist aspirations (e.g., see Talbot, 1998; Verma, 2001; Cohen, 2004). More recent historical scholarship, however, points to deeper disagreements over post-colonial state structures and scales of governance (between the Indian Muslim political leadership in the All-India Muslim League and the more secularist nationalist leadership of the Indian National Congress) as the main driver of secessionist politics in colonial India (e.g., see Jalal, 1994; Singh, 2009). Regardless of one's sympathy for the religious versus secular explanation for Pakistani state formation, post-colonial Pakistan, much like India, has grappled with issues of religion, ethnic identity, and centralized versus

decentralized governance structures in its polity (Jalal, 1995). Many of Pakistan's current violent geographies can be best understood through the lens of these internal social and political cleavages derived from its colonial borders, in addition to the geopolitics of the country's alignment with the West.

A detailed history of the Pakistani state and civil society following partition from India can be found elsewhere (e.g., Malik, 1997; Abbas, 2005).[6] The key point is that Islam continues to be one of the many contested themes in the Pakistani national narrative, in addition to ethno-linguistic conflict and decentralized governance. For most of Pakistan's history the various ethno-nationalist forces have been in favor of decentralized governance structures, whereas the Islamist forces have tended to support the idea of a stronger center. Ethno-nationalist centrifugal forces culminated in the division of the country, with its eastern wing forming the new state of Bangladesh in 1971. In the aftermath of that national trauma, the populist government of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto gave a federalist constitution to the country, but in practice pursued a highly authoritarian centralized style of governance. Mr. Bhutto perceived the right-wing religious parties as the main threat to his government and was deeply insecure about the depth of his own support among the electorate (Hasan, 1988). That insecurity not only led him to orchestrate unnecessary rigging of the 1976 national elections but also to periodically concede to many of the religious right's demands, such as declaring certain sects heretical, prohibiting alcohol, and changing the weekly holiday from Sunday to Friday (ibid.). Concession of political and public space to the religious right by the Bhutto government continued under the dictatorship of General Zia-ul-Haq, who replaced Mr. Bhutto in a coup in 1977.

It was under Zia-ul-Haq's regime (1977–1988) that Pakistan became a frontline state in the Cold War as a consequence of the Soviet invasion of neighboring Afghanistan in 1979. The Soviets' ill-fated war to dominate Afghanistan (1979–1989) perversely worked to the advantage of the Zia regime. While Zia already had instituted some judicial measures, such as public hangings and floggings and mass arrests of the political opposition, his alignment with the West against the Soviets provided him the much-needed international acceptability and financial support to sustain his regime. Zia's new allies were unwilling to challenge him on his human rights record, and instead made available considerable resources to the Pakistani intelligence agencies, primarily the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), for funneling to the anti-Soviet Afghan resistance (Malik, 1997; Abbas, 2005; Mustafa, 2005a). Saudi support matched that from the Americans, funding the Pakistani intelligence services in their covert war against the Soviets (Nasr, 2000; Johnson, 2008). The Zia regime, with Saudi advice, was ultimately in charge of priming various resistance groups for receipt of Western aid (Nawaz, 2008). The groups selected by Pakistan were typically the Islamist elements (e.g., those led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Ahmed Shah Massoud) who had opposed the pro-Soviet Afghan regimes throughout the 1970s, as well as some of the most conservative and pro-Wahhabi elements, such as Abdul Rasul Sayyaf (Rashid, 2001, 2008).[7]

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[6]It is sufficient here to note that the founding of Pakistan in 1947 under the leadership of Muhammad Ali Jinnah was preceded by strikes, protests and massive violence across India. Similarly, the secession of Bangladesh (East Pakistan) from Pakistan in 1971 was marked by fighting between the West and and East wings of the country and generated as many as one million refugees before India's intervention on behalf of the East was instrumental in securing the independence of Bangladesh.

[7]The term "Wahhabi" ("Wahhabism," "Wahhabist") refers to a particular interpretation of Islam that emerged with the foundations of the modern Saudi Arabian state. An important concern of Wahhabism is the inviolability of Arabia and especially its two holy mosques. The tradition also prizes militancy in service of religious values, and is seen as a strict return to (or purification of) the faith (Simon and Benjamin, 2001; see also Al-Rasheed, 2002 and Niblock, 2006). In line with Wiktorowicz (2006), we use the term precisely (as a link to a specific interpretation of Islam) and not as a general descriptor for Islamic extremism.

The negative consequences of Pakistani support of Islamist elements in the Afghan resistance for Afghanistan's public politics and "civilian life" became well known after the end of the Cold War (Hilali, 2002; Abbas, 2005; Nawaz, 2008). What was less known until September 11, 2001 was the "blow-back" of the violent religious agenda in Afghanistan (and subsequently in Indian-administered Kashmir) on Pakistan's own society (Hussain, 2007).

Starting with Zia's unpopular attempts at Islamizing Pakistani society, public spaces were systematically subjected to gendered constriction as well as to any alternate interpretation of religion, culture, history, and politics beyond the narrowly sanctioned line authorized by the state (Mustafa, 2006). Islamization, and particularly a specific type of strict Islamization represented by the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) party, frowned upon public displays of joy, public gatherings, street theater, or carnival. And for any public gatherings that were permitted, women were systematically excluded or segregated and granted only a bystander's role (Marsden, 2008). Civil society and political life were suppressed and sports stadiums and traffic intersections stigmatized with terror as sites of public floggings, hangings, and random harassment of couples for the purpose of checking for immoral behavior (Mustafa, 2006; Saigol, 2009; Husain, 2010).

Through the 1990s, while Pakistani politics oscillated between the center-left and center-right governments of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, respectively, one constant in foreign policy was an obsession with Kashmir and a continued attempt at dominating the post-Soviet political landscape in Afghanistan (Rashid, 2001; Yasmeen, 2003) as part of a "strategic depth" strategy to prevent being outflanked by India (Hanif, 2010). In both cases, Pakistan used its Islamist protégés to dominate Afghanistan and provide soldiers to augment the Kashmiri insurgency (previously indigenous) against Indian rule (Nasr, 2004). The recruitment of these movements came from the ranks of impoverished landless tenants and small farmers in the southern portion of the feudal-dominated province of Punjab and the rural lower class from the ethnic Pashtun belt in western Pakistan (Behuria, 2007; Perlez and Shah, 2009). The key consequence of involvement with these movements was a rising incidence of Sunni–Shi'a sectarian violence, particularly in southern Punjab. However, with the end of the Cold War, international politics and diplomacy were focused elsewhere, and thus the sectarian violence in Pakistan drew little international attention. Not until the violence of the region became globalized—or rather, not until the violence threatened the civilian life of Europe and America—did Pakistan's internal violence and regional relationships become an issue of worldwide concern.[8]

Geographies of Post-9/11 Terror in Pakistan

The left-leaning parties that had aligned themselves with the ethno-nationalist identity politics of the Sindhi, Baloch, Pashtun, and to a much lesser extent, Punjabi ethnic groups (whose distributions are depicted in Fig. 1) had been deliberately sidelined and even oppressed by the Pakistani state throughout its existence. However, beginning in the 1980s, one of the accomplishments of 20 years of state patronage of conservative Islam in the Pashtun areas

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[8]In no small measure, international concern for Pakistan's national security reflects anxiety over the security of the country's nuclear weapons. The nuclear weapons program, launched by Pakistan in 1972 in the aftermath of the loss of East Pakistan (following Indian intervention in the secession conflict), had by 1995 progressed to weapons-grade uranium production and by 1998 to successful nuclear weapons testing. A few years into the new millennium, the country was estimated to possess 24–48 warheads containing highly enriched uranium, with sufficient reserves of bomb-grade fuel to produce perhaps that many more (FAS, 2002). A more recent statement by a retired general in the Pakistani Strategic Plans Division increased that estimate to 80–120 genuine warheads (Iqbal, 2007).

of the North Western Frontier Province (NWFP)[9] and Balochistan was to realign Pashtun identity politics away from its secular/leftist leanings and more toward the Islamist parties (Mustafa, 2006). With a resurgent TTP, it seemed that the realignment was complete, but the victory of leftist Pashtun parties in recent elections in 2008 and the swing in Pashtun public opinion against the TTP seem to indicate that the realignment is by no means irreversible. Nevertheless one has to be mindful that the influence of the Wahabbist-inspired Islamic conservatives in Pakistani society, particularly among the Pashtuns, remains significant (Hussain, 2007; Husain, 2010).

On September 11, 2001 the military ruler of Pakistan, General Pervaiz Musharraf, reversed 20 years of pro-Taliban and pro-Islamist policies in Afghanistan and Kashmir in the face of American outrage at the events of that day. Musharraf's policy reversal was perceived as a deep betrayal by Pakistan's former clients such as the Taliban and their allied groups fighting in Kashmir, and they were to make their anger well known in the form of multiple attempts to assassinate Musharraf and a series of bombings across the country (Abbas, 2005; Hussain, 2007). Although some of Pakistan's client militant groups, such as Harkat-ul-Ansar (active in Kashmir) may have had dealings with Al-Qa'eda, there is little evidence to suggest that Pakistan's government had any direct contact with the group (Nawaz, 2008). Also, while there was a phase of missionary Islamism in the Pakistani intelligence agencies such as the ISI, by most accounts those influences were cleansed earlier in the 1990s, leaving only a diminished ideological fondness for the TTP and similar groups (Abbas, 2005; Nawaz, 2008).[10] For the Pakistani state these groups were convenient strategic assets against vastly superior Indian conventional forces in Kashmir, and provided a means of keeping the Indians out of Afghanistan. However, these assets increasingly were to become a major liability, as the relationship between the state and these groups grew increasingly distant (Hussain, 2007; Rashid, 2008).

The violent outcome of the diverging interests between militant groups and the state soon became apparent. Between 2003 and July 2008, 8,330 people were killed in Pakistan from suicide attacks and bomb blasts. Of this number 4,300 perished in 66 suicide attacks between July 2007 and January 2008 alone (Post-Lal, 2008). Although bombings and suicide attacks have at times targeted security personnel in the country, of the 4,300 people killed in 2007/2008 only 17 percent were security personnel. The year 2009 was the worst in terms of loss of human life, when according to the Pakistani Institute of Peace Studies 12,632 men and women were killed (PIPS, 2010). Of the dead, 3,021 were killed by insurgents, 6,329 in Pakistan army operations, 1,163 in army–TTP battles, 700 in border violence, and 1,419 in other violence, including drone strikes (Fisk, 2010; PIPS, 2010). Figures 2 and 3 indicate the total monthly numbers and locations, respectively, of violent terrorist attacks against civilians and security forces in Pakistan in 2008 and 2009.

As shown in Figure 3, the pattern of violence during the course of these two years is concentrated in the Khyber-Pakhtunkwa province (i.e., the former NWFP), which was the main staging ground for the anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan in the 1980s. Suicide bombings in Pakistan inspired by Al-Qaeda and the Taliban have targeted security installations, as would be expected in revenge for the Pakistani military's ongoing counterinsurgency operations in the

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[9]In 2010, the NWFP was renamed Khyber-Pakhtunkwa.

[10]This view is contested to some extent by recent information revealed through the WikiLeaks release of secret U.S. military reports in July 2010 (Mazzetti et al., 2010). The reports highlight Afghani fears that Pakistani officers of the ISI met directly with the Taliban to organize networks of militant groups fighting against U.S. forces in Afghanistan (Walsh, 2010). For a very recent geographic assessment of violent events in Afghanistan recorded in the WikiLeaks war logs, see O'Loughlin et al. (2010b, in this issue).

Fig. 2. Number of terrorist attacks against civilians and security forces in Pakistan, January 2008–December 2009. *Source:* Compiled from the ACLED database (ACLED, n.d.) on violent events by Andrew Linke, University of Colorado.

borderlands. However, suicide bombings and other types of violence have also been directed at such seemingly irrelevant civilian targets as lawyers' rallies for the restoration of the country's deposed chief justice,[11] Eid prayer congregations, mosques, girls' schools, barber shops, restaurants, and music stores. In one of the more spectacular examples of the terrorist targeting of a public event (although immediately prior to the period covered by the map), two suicide blasts killed 170 and injured hundreds at a rally celebrating the triumphant return (from exile) of Benazir Bhutto to Karachi on October 19, 2007. In a country where public spaces had been severely constricted under the rule of General Zia in the 1980s and the subsequent sectarian violence and moral policing by other Islamist elements (Hasan, 1988; Abbas, 2005), Bhutto's political rallies—more so than those of other political parties—served as an expression of political unity among people comprising a large segment of the population.

There is also a marked gender dimension to TTP targeting of public spaces. In Pakistan's Swat district alone, where a TTP-inspired insurgency has been under way since 2005, 276 schools (167 of them for girls) have been damaged or defaced by the Taliban (ADB and WB, 2009). Many parents have been afraid to send their daughters to school, while many working women have feared going to work or even shopping for such mundane items as clothes other than the burqa. Overall by the end of 2009 in the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province and the FATA areas affected by the Taliban insurgency, 473 schools had been partially or completely damaged because of the activities of the Taliban or their allies (ibid.).

While the violence (and associated loss of life) has been appalling enough, one of its more insidious consequences has been the constriction of public spaces for the expression of political and social life (Mumtaz, 2010); any type of cultural event in the urban areas of Pakistan now requires multiple layers of security. Pakistanis have even stopped patronizing restaurants and other public spaces for fear of becoming victims of terrorist violence. This was particularly the case in the Swat valley (Fig. 1), where the TTP transformed popular street

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[11]These included, in addition to lawyers of all political persuasions, members of the general public.

Fig. 3. Locations of terrorist attacks against civilians (A) and security forces (B) in Pakistan in 2008 and 2009. *Source:* Compiled from the ACLED database (ACLED, n.d.) on violent events by Andrew Linke, University of Colorado.

intersections and promenades in local towns and villages into human abattoirs, where people were routinely beheaded and their headless bodies strung up from electricity polls for days on end. And if local women of the area (with no tradition of wearing Afghan-style all-covering burqas) were found outside of their homes without burqas, they were routinely beaten and harassed.

The control of Swat by TTP runs counter to existing models seeking to explain radicalization and terrorism that stress underdevelopment or marginalization as preconditions for civil conflict (Piazza, 2006; Collier et al., 2009). Until the early 2000s, Swat had a reasonably developed economy based on tourism, mining, handicrafts, and agriculture, and a significant presence of internationally funded development projects (primarily Dutch and Swiss). Initially the TTP movement enjoyed some local support in Swat, where their message of religiously derived, quickly administered justice seemed to resonate with the rural population (Rose, 2009).[12] Among other things, the TTP promised to do away with the modern court system, which has been the source of considerable public anger.

In reaction, the federal government appeared to make a series of concessions to TTP demands for the introduction of their version of Sharia law in Swat. Such concessions were combined with a series of limited military offensives, between 2005 and 2007, which sought to keep the TTP from completely taking over the state infrastructure in that region. It was only when the Taliban's objectives expanded to include regime change, and the "realities" of TTP control and justice were televised across Pakistan, that national and local public opinion became increasingly critical of the movement (Rose, 2009). The turn in public opinion brought about another military operation in 2009 that produced one of the largest internal displacements of a civilian population in the post–World War II era, uprooting more than 2.5 million people (ADB and WB, 2009). Following the largely successful offensive, roughly 70 percent of the internally displaced peoples had returned to their home villages in the valley by December 2009, a flow that continues today (Livingston and O'Hanlon, 2010). The Pakistani military has now initiated similar anti-militant offensives in the southern FATA agencies of South Waziristan (and possibly even North Waziristan). But sustaining gains made against insurgents on the battlefield will entail much more than military checkpoints and police actions.

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

A comprehensive assessment of whether Pakistan can avoid the prolonged turmoil and civil strife experienced by Afghanistan lies beyond the scope of this paper. Selective comparisons between the two countries according to some frequently used social and economic indicators (tabulated in Table 1) are nonetheless illuminating, again with the caveat (noted above in the case of Swat) that the emergence and persistence of terrorism is not always explained by models that seek to link it to preconditions of underdevelopment or marginalization. Pakistan ranks more favorably than Afghanistan on all indicators in the table for which comparable data are available. However, in some cases, such as corruption, human development, and characteristics of a failed state, the differences are not substantial. And in others, namely life expectancy, infant mortality, and GDP per capita, while the differences are of an order of magnitude, they are heavily influenced by the overt warfare, the major role played by informal sectors (e.g., illicit poppy seed cultivation and opium production) in the economy,

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[12]This was particularly the case because Swat has had no land settlement; inasmuch as the vast majority of litigation in rural Swat (as all other areas of Pakistan) is based on land disputes. It should be noted that few formal land records exist that local courts could use to adjudicate land disputes based on common law (Swat Promises, 2010). Consequently, the average litigant is likely to spend decades in civil court without meaningful redress.

Table 1. Selected Economic and Social Indicators of Pakistan and Afghanistan, 2009–2010

Name of index	Compiled by	Year of compilation	Pakistan World rank	Index[a]	Afghanistan World rank	Index
Economic freedom[b]	Heritage Foundation	2010	117	55.2	n.a.	n.a.
Life expectancy[c]	United Nations	2009	117	66.2	193	43.6
Infant mortality[d]	U.S. Central Intelligence Agency	2010	27	65.3	2	151.5
Corruption perception[e]	Transparency International	2009	139	2.4	179	1.3
Quality of life[f]	Economist Intelligence Unit	2009	94	5.4	n.a.	n.a.
Human development[g]	United Nations	2009	141	0.57	181	0.35
Population[h]	Population Reference Bureau	2009	6	181	32	28.4
GDP per capita[i]	International Monetary Fund	2010	132	2661	169	935
Failed states[j]	*Foreign Policy* and The Fund for Peace	2010	10	102.5	6	109.3

[a]Numbers in the columns below the "Index" headings report the absolute values of the respective indexed categories.

[b]Score of 100 signifies an economic environment or set of policies most conducive to 10 broad factors of economic freedom. Index compiled for 179 countries. Hong Kong ranked number 1 (most economic freedom) with an index value of 89.7 and North Korea number 179 (least economic freedom) with an index value of 1.0. Afghanistan was not ranked because of data constraints.

[c]Overall life expectancy at birth (years) calculated for 2007. Index compiled for 194 countries. Japan ranked number 1 with an index value of 82.7 and Zimbabwe number 194 with an index value of 43.4.

[d]Number of deaths of infants under one year of age per 1,000 live births in a given year. Index compiled for 224 countries. Ranking is in descending order from countries with highest rates to those with lowest rates (high rankings indicate high levels of mortality). Angola (highest infant mortality) ranked number 1 with an index value of 178.13. Monaco (lowest infant mortality) ranked number 224 with an index value of 1.78.

[e]Degree to which corruption defined as abuse of public office for private gain (measured in part on court cases involving bribes) is perceived to exist among officials and politicians. Scored on a scale of 0 (highly corrupt) to 10 (least corrupt). Index compiled for 180 countries. Ranking is in descending order from least corrupt to most corrupt. New Zealand (least corrupt) ranked number 1 with an index value of 9.4; Somalia (most corrupt) ranked number 180 with an index value of 1.1.

[f]Scored on a scale of 10 (highest quality of life) to 0 (lowest quality), the index is based on nine determinants of life satisfaction. Compiled for 160 countries. Norway (highest quality of life) ranked number 1 with an index value of 8.08; Chad (lowest quality of life) ranked number 160 with an index value of 4.01. Afghanistan was not ranked because of data constraints.

[g]Scored on a scale of 1.00 (highest human development) to 0 (lowest development), the index represents a comparative measure of life expectancy, literacy, education, and standards of living. Compiled for 182 countries. Norway (highest human development) ranked number 1 with an index value of 0.971; Niger (lowest human development) ranked number 182 with an index of 0.34.

[h]Population in millions appears in the column "Index." Ranking of 197 countries by Population Reference Bureau. China (largest absolute population) ranked number 1 (1.3 billion), whereas Tuvalu (11,640) ranked number 197.

[i]Gross domestic product (purchasing power parity) in 2009 divided by estimated population for 181 countries. Denominated in current international dollars. Qatar (largest GDP per capita) ranked number 1 with a per capita GDP of $83,841; the Democratic Republic of the Congo ranked number 181 with a value of $332.

[j]Composite measure of the extent to which a sovereign government is considered to have failed to adequately exert physical control over its state's territory, monopolize the legitimate use of physical force and state-level decision-making authority, provide a reasonable array of public services, foster economic development, and interact with other states and the international community. Ranking of 177 countries. Somalia (most failed state) ranked number 1 with an index value of 114.3; Norway (least failed state) ranked number 177 with an index value of 18.7.

Sources: Compiled by the author from EIU, 2009; PRB, 2009, pp. 6–9; Transparency International, 2009; UNDP, 2009; CIA, 2010; FP and TFFP, 2010; Heritage Foundation, 2010; IMF, 2010.

and similar conditions in Afghanistan. However, given our preceding discussion about the importance of political life and public spaces to the quality of human life, and a desire to move assessments of counter-terrorism beyond static notions of governance, it is worth noting that Pakistan tends to be mid-ranking in the "quality of life" assessments. This ranking and our analysis of terrorist targeting patterns based on political participation and public space present an opportunity for a more positive outlook than these statistics might initially suggest.

Ultimately, therefore, those seeking to foster conditions supporting a more secure future for the population of Pakistan must expand their focus to other issues. Attempts to neutralize TTP control depend in no small measure on the population's understanding of the limited vision of life the Taliban offers and, upon that recognition, their ability to freely communicate these views without fear. The TTP's ultimate goal, of restricting (through violence) Pakistani public life to a limited class of people and range of activities, needs to be countered by more active government support (in the form of enhanced security) for myriad public events encompassing the diversity of Pakistani society. Equally necessary are far-reaching reforms of institutions that perpetuate economic and social inequality, belie the principle of fairness, and impede the development of national unity and a sense of community. In the end, further reform of an inefficient and regressive tax system,[13] a corruption-prone judiciary and public services sector, and a woefully underdeveloped public educational system, as well as steps taken to bolster civilian political authority (at some expense of the military's) together with orderly regime succession, will be as much a part of reclaiming Pakistan's public space as just defeating the Taliban.

The importance of distinguishing oneself, and acknowledging human plurality, cannot be underestimated given that its opposite is when humans become "absolutely superfluous" in the totalitarian project. Arendt (1973, pp. 57–58) identified the biggest threat to the public realm when "it is seen only under one aspect and is permitted to present itself in only one perspective." Politics in accessible public spaces has the capacity to subvert this logic by drawing attention to the plurality of civilian life and the ability to initiate something new and something unforeseen (Hansen, 1993; Beltran, 2009, p. 601). In Pakistan, politics has the distinct flavor of a carnival, as does the syncretic religious observance of the predominant Sufi tradition. Beyond the obvious politico-religious significance of such manifestations of togetherness, even such mundane events as music concerts and the kite festival of *basant* have come to take on a political valence, where they have come to be identified by many in Pakistan as very political acts of defiance against forces of obscurantism (Husain, 2010).

Recognizing these elements of a plural politics is why we differ from others (e.g., from Gritzner, 2010) who focus on "instrumental" and "eco-restorational" aspects of life as a counter to terrorism. Relying on indicators of economic development, the delivery of resources (or massive restoration of the environment) addresses only the material condition of living, but not this broader understanding of politics and "civilian life." Furthermore, recognizing these elements of politics draws our attention to human geography and the need to protect civilian life spaces. We suggest that counter-terrorism measures need to do more than protect such spaces, but also to affirm them. We believe that counter-terrorism must do more than place/ space destruction, as the Pakistani military interventions in the Swat valley seem to have achieved, or improve service delivery and administration of justice (as the civilian authorities

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[13]Primary among these is the tax system. Pakistan's revenue from taxes (as a percentage of GDP) ranks among the lowest in the world, largely as a result of widespread tax avoidance by the wealthy through a series of legal loopholes vigorously defended by the country's political and economic élite (Tavernise, 2010).

were doing in Swat before the August flooding); it must change the space to make it resistant to TTP overtures and violence.

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